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COMMENTS

INTO THE WILD: THE UNEVEN AND SELFDEFEATING EFFECTS OF BELL ATLANTIC V.
TWOMBL Y
JASON BARTLETT*

INTRODUCTION
Discovery in modem civil litigation is often an undertaking of immense
proportions. As one report concluded, discovery can account for ninety
percent of litigation costs where it is actively employed.1 Overall, this
represents nearly half of the cost of litigation in all cases. 2 Given this fact,
* J.D. Candidate, May 2009, St. John's University School of Law; B.A. Political Science, magna
cum laude, Loyola College in Maryland, May 2006. The author would like to thank Professor Paul F.
Kirgis for his assistance and guidance in preparing this comment.
I Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 192 F.R.D. 340, 357 (2000); Judicial
Conference Adopts Rules Changes, Confronts Projected Budget Shortfalls, THIRD BRANCH (Admin.
Office of the U.S. Courts, Wash. D.C.), Oct. 1999, at 10, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/
oct99ttb/octoberl999.htm. But see Thomas E. Willging et al., An Empirical Study of Discovery and
Disclosure Practice Under the 1993 Federal Rule Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REv. 525, 531 (1998)
(commenting on an empirical study which showed that most discovery costs are modest and
proportionate to parties' needs and stakes in cases).
2 Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 192 F.R.D. at 357; see Samuel Issacharoff, The
Content of our Casebooks: Why Do Cases Get Litigated?, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1265, 1272 (2002)
(noting that discovery costs serve two important functions of expanding potential settlement zones and
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the Supreme Court has often expressed a concern with "in terrorem"
litigation brought by plaintiffs brandishing the threat of costly litigation in
order to extort a hefty settlement on a largely meritless claim. 3 For years,
many thought that the liberal notice pleading standard established by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which were adopted in 1938, made the
potential for such abuse of discovery an unfortunate but necessary way of
life. 4 Since a complaint would not be dismissed unless it became clear that
under "no set of facts" could the plaintiff succeed in his claim, 5 defendants
unable to prove the impossibility of their adversaries' meritless claims were
forced to endure at least some degree of discovery costs before the case
could be dismissed. Indeed, the decision by the framers of the Federal
Rules to put the focus of the litigation process on determining the merits of
a claim through a flexible pretrial process rather than on the pleadings
necessarily resulted in such an outcome. 6
Recently, in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 7 the Supreme Court

attempted to diminish the likelihood of discovery abuse by raising the bar
for plaintiffs bringing claims in federal court. In holding that a complaint
must provide "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

bringing parties' assessments of cases into line before trial).
3 See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 741 (1975) (discussing how abusive
use of the liberal discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "represent[s] an in
terrorem increment of the settlement value"); see also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioners, Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007) (No. 05-1126), 2006 U.S.
S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 701, at *I (arguing that meritless antitrust suits, "if not promptly dismissed,...
create economic inefficiencies, chill pro-competitive conduct, and act as a drain on the economy
because they force parties either to expend substantial resources to defend themselves or to succumb to
in terroremsettlement demands").
4 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REv. 635, 645 ("Perhaps a system in
which judges pare away issues and focus investigation is too radical to contemplate in this country -although it prevailed here before 1938, when the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted. The
change could not be accomplished without abandoning notice pleading, increasing the number of
judicial officers, and giving them more authority (the system depends on the presiding officer having
the power to decide). If we are to rule out judge-directed discovery, however, we must be prepared to
pay the piper. Part of the price is the high cost of unnecessary discovery -- impositional and
otherwise."); see also Tim Oliver Brandi, The Strike Suit: A Common Problem of the Derivative Suit
and the ShareholderClass Action, 98 DICK. L. REv. 355, 370 (1993) (discussing how shareholder strike
suits are facilitated by the liberal notice pleading standard).
5 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957), abrogated by Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955; see
Amber A. Pelot, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly: Mere Adjustment or Stringent New Requirement in
Pleading?,59 MERCER L. REv. 1371, 1377 (2008) (explaining that Conley "permitted dismissal only
when proceeding to discovery would be futile" and that the "'no set of facts' language has been "cited
over 10,000 times since the decision").
6 Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002) ("The liberal notice pleading of Rule
8(a) is the starting point of a simplified pleading system, which was adopted to focus litigation on the
merits of a claim."). See Conley, 355 U.S. at 48 ("The Federal Rules reject the approach that pleading is
a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept the
principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits.").
7 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007).
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face," 8 the Court purported to erect a significant hurdle restricting entry to
the costly discovery stage of litigation. 9 However, while Twombly will
certainly have a significant impact on motion practice in federal courts, the
decision has inherent inconsistencies that will considerably limit its effect
in curbing discovery costs. Part I of this Comment will examine how
Twombly has significantly redefined the meaning of Rule 8(a)(2)'s
command that a complaint provide "a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,"' 0 and discuss the
Court's policy-based justification for its re-interpretation. Part II will
examine the dual levels of confusion brought about by the Twombly
Court's lack of clarity regarding the meaning of "plausible" and the scope
of the standard's applicability. Finally, Part III will discuss how this "dual
confusion" is a substantial hindrance to the achievement of the Court's
goal, namely, the protection of defendants against the costs of impositional
discovery.
I. FROM CONLEYTO TWOMBLY: THE REDEFINITION OF THE
MEANING OF RULE 8(A)
A. Pleadingin HistoricalContext
Prior to Twombly, civil procedure textbooks referenced Conley v.
Gibson"l when describing the standard of 12(b)(6) motions. In that case, a
group of black railroad workers brought suit against their local union after
the group members were fired and replaced by white workers.1 2 The
plaintiffs alleged that, in violation of the National Railway Labor Act, the
union failed to protect them against these discriminatory discharges. 13 The
district court granted the union's motion to dismiss the complaint, and the
court of appeals affirmed the judgment.14 The Supreme Court reversed,
8 Id. at 1974.
9 See Andree Sophia Blumstein, A Higher Standard: 'wombly' Requires More for Notice
Pleading, 43 TENN. B.J. 12, 12 (2007) ("Impelled by a sense that discovery, particularly complex
litigation discovery, has been allowed to run amok, the court crafted a stricter standard of review for
motions to dismiss, so that the legal viability of claims can be evaluated with greater scrutiny before
discovery costs engulf the parties and the courts."); see also Saritha Komatireddy Tice, Recent
Developments: A "Plausible" Explanationof PleadingStandards: Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127
S. Ct. 1955 (2007), 31 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 827, 829 (2008) (reflecting the majority's alarm over
rising discovery costs and affects on settlement values).
10 FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
11 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
12 Id. at 42-43.
13 Id. at 43.
14 Id. at 43-44. The union moved for dismissal on several grounds, including lack of jurisdiction
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finding that the plaintiffs had stated a claim upon which relief could be
granted under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 15 Writing for
the Court, Justice Black articulated the language that would become the
oft-quoted mantra of judges, practitioners, and law students 16 alike:
In appraising the sufficiency of the complaint we follow, of course,
the accepted rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure
to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can
prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him
to relief. 17
The plaintiffs had alleged that they were wrongfully discharged and that
the union had failed to protect their jobs or to help them with their
grievances on account of their race. 18 Since these allegations, if proven to
be true, would entitle the plaintiffs to relief, the complaint was sufficient. 19
In so finding, the Court explicitly rejected the union's claim that the
plaintiffs had failed to set forth sufficient facts to support their general
allegations, noting that the "simplified 'notice pleading' approach of the
Federal Rules did not require a claimant to plead the factual basis for his
claim.2

0

As Justice Stevens noted in his dissent in Twombly, Conley was
repeatedly cited as authority by the federal courts, including eleven times

(arguing that the National Railroad Adjustment Board had exclusive jurisdiction over the controversy),
failure to join an indispensable party and failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Id.
The district court actually relied upon the first ground, lack of jurisdiction, in granting the motion. Id.
The court of appeals "apparently rel[ied] on the same ground" in affirming that judgment. Id. at 44.
However, the Supreme Court found that the act purporting to give the Board exclusive jurisdiction
applied only to disputes between employees and employers, not employees and their unions. Id. at 4445. The Court also found that the union's second asserted ground, failure to join an indispensable party
(the employer railroad company), was meritless, leaving only the final ground, failure to state a claim,
to be considered. Id. at 45.
15 Id. at 47-48. "The Federal Rules reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which
one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept the principle that the purpose of
pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits." Id. at 48.
16 See Adam H. Charnes & James J. Hefferan, Jr., Friendly to Corporations,29 NAT'L L.J. 49, at
10 col.l (2007) (describing the Conley standard as "well known" and a "venerable precedent . . .
learned by generations of law students"); see also William Kolasky & David Olsky, Commentary, Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly: Laying Conley v. Gibson to Rest, 22 ANTITRUST 27, 27 (2007)
(highlighting Conley's half-century reputation in civil procedure).
17 Conley, 355 U.S. at 46-47 (emphasis added).
18 Id. at47.
19 Id. at 47-48.
20 Id. ("To the contrary, all the Rules require is 'a short and plain statement of the claim' that will
give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests ...
Such simplified 'notice pleading' is made possible by the liberal opportunity for discovery and the other
pretrial procedures established by the Rules to disclose more precisely the basis of both claim and
defense and to define more narrowly the disputed facts and issues.")
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by the Supreme Court. 2 1 Prior to Twombly, district courts had referenced
the "no set of facts" language literally thousands of times when ruling on
motions to dismiss. 22 Justice Black's words were learned and relearned by
civil procedure students for decades. Any doubts regarding Conley were
thought to have been put to rest by two relatively recent cases. In
Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination
Unit,23 the Court overturned a Fifth Circuit decision imposing a heightened
pleading standard on a complaint alleging municipal liability for a civil
rights violation. 24 The Supreme Court held that only where Rule 9(b) was
applicable could a heightened pleading standard be employed 25 and, "in the
absence of amendment to Rules 8 or 9, the courts could rely only on control
of discovery and summary judgment to 'weed out unmeritorious
claims. "'26
21 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1978 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing SEC
v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 818 (2002); Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Ed., 526 U.S. 629, 654 (1999)
(calling upon the standard established in Conley as a precedent); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California,
509 U.S. 764, 811 (1993) (including Conley as a basis to support the maintenance of the petitioner's
claim); Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 598 (1989) (applying the Conley principle regarding
allegations viewed in the light most helpful to the petitioner); Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 10 (1980)
(per curiam) (relying on Conley to decide that the District Court improperly dismissed one of
petitioner's claims); McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, Inc., 444 U.S. 232, 246 (1980) (using
the Conley standard to support not dismissing a plaintiff's claim based on provable facts); Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (making reference to Conley about whether the facts of plaintiffs
allegations constitute a §1983 claim); Hospital Building Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital, 425 U.S. 738,
746 (1976) (determining that allegations of conspiracy related to unreasonable burdens on free and
uninterrupted interstate commerce constitute sufficient grounds for a claim to not be dismissed);
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974) (basing its holding for whether a plaintiff successfully
plead a §1983 claim on the Conley standard); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972) (per curiam)
(referencing Conley regarding a claim based on rights to freedom of religious expression); Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 521 (1972) (per curiam) (supporting the decision to hold for the defendant
wherein "the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to
relief."). See generally Scott Dodson, Pleading Standards After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 93 VA.
L.
REV.
BRIEF
135,
137
(2007)
[hereinafter
Dodson
article],
available
at
http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/
2007/07/09/dodson.pdf ("The Supreme Court had cited to the 'no set of facts' language in Conley
twelve times in controlling opinions, and many lower courts had adhered to it and its liberal noticepleading standard.").
22 See Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157 n.7 (2d Cir. 2007) (noting that federal courts cited Conley
"at least 10,000 times in a wide variety of contexts (according to a Westlaw search)"); see also In re
Ocwen Loan Servicing, L.L.C., 491 F.3d 638, 648-49 (7th Cir. 2007) (referring to the Conley language
as "canonical").
23 507 U.S. 163 (1993).
24 Id. at 168.
25 Id. (stating that Rule 9(b) "provides that 'in all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances
constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity'); see lqbal, 490 F.3d at 153 (noting that
the Court in Leatherman suggests that heightened pleading standards are only permissible when
authorized by Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
26 Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 153. As Justice Stevens observed in his Twombly dissent, the Fifth Circuit
justified its heightened pleading standard in Leatherman as an effort to combat "'the enormous expense
involved today in litigation."' Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1981 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Leatherman
v. Tarrant County NarcoticsIntelligence and Coordination Unit, 954 F.2d 1054, 1057 (5th Cir. 1992)).
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The Court's 2002 ruling in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.27 also
reaffirmed the crucial role of discovery under the liberal notice pleading
regime of the Federal Rules. In that case, the Second Circuit required a
plaintiff to plead facts establishing a prima facie case to get a claim of
employment discrimination into discovery. 28 The Court struck down this
measure, noting that "Rule 8(a) establishes a pleading standard without
regard to whether a claim will succeed on the merits." 29 Citing Conley, the
Court once again ruled that the Federal Rules' "simplified notice pleading
standard relies on liberal discovery rules and summary judgment motions
to define disputed facts and issues and to dispose of unmeritorious
claims." 30 Only the exceptions of Rule 9(b) were subject to a heightened
31
pleading standard.
B. The Twombly Decision and its Policy-BasedJustification
The plaintiffs in Twombly were a putative class of "subscribers of local
telephone and/or high speed internet services." 32 Bringing suit in the
District Court for the Southern District of New York, they alleged that the
defendants, Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers ("ILECs"), had conspired
to keep competing local telephone companies, referred to as Competitive
Local Exchange Carriers ("CLECs"), out of the market. 33 The plaintiffs
brought their claim under § 1 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits "every
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
34
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States."
The ILECs were alleged to have inflated charges for local telephone and
high-speed Internet services in two ways. First, the plaintiffs claimed that
27 534 U.S. 506 (2002).
28 Id. at 511 (explaining that under the Second Circuit's heightened pleading standard, if plaintiff
did not have direct evidence of discrimination at the time a complaint was made, plaintiff must still
plead a prima facie case).
29 Id. at 515; see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974) ("Indeed it may appear on the face
of the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely but that is not the test."), abrogated by
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
30 Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512 (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,47-48 (1957)).
31 Id. at 513 ("Rule 8(a)'s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited
exceptions. Rule 9(b), for example, provides for greater particularity in all averments of fraud or
mistake. This Court, however, has declined to extend such exceptions to other contexts.").
32 Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1962 (2007).
33 Id. The four defendant ILECs were the four predecessors of the original seven "Baby Bells"
created when AT&T was broken up in 1984: BellSouth Corporation, Qwest Communications
International, Inc., SBC Communications, Inc., and Verizon Communications, Inc. id. at 1962 n.I. As
the opinion noted, these four companies were alleged to control "90 percent or more of the market for
local telephone service in the 48 contiguous States." Id.
34 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2008). The plaintiffs sought treble damages, as well as declaratory and injunctive
relief.
Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1962.
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the defendants had "'engaged in parallel conduct' in dealing unfairly with
the CLECs.35 The complaint pointed to a "'compelling common
motivation' to thwart the CLECs' competitive efforts," which in turn
"naturally led [the defendants] to form a conspiracy." 36 Second, the
plaintiffs alleged agreements between the ILECs to not compete against
each other, to be inferred from the ILECs' failure to pursue business
opportunities in contiguous markets controlled by the other ILECs.37
Ultimately, the complaint summed up the plaintiffs' contentions as follows:
In the absence of any meaningful competition between the [ILECs]
in one another's markets, and in light of the parallel course of
conduct that each engaged in to prevent competition from CLECs
within their respective local telephone and/or high speed internet
services markets and the other facts and market circumstances
alleged above, Plaintiffs allege upon information and belief that [the
ILECs] have entered into a contract, combination or conspiracy to
prevent competitive entry in their respective local telephone and/or
high speed internet services markets and have agreed not to
compete with one another and otherwise allocated customers and
markets to one another.38
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The district court granted
the motion. 39 The court found that allegations of parallel business conduct
alone did not state a claim under § 1 of the Sherman Act. 40 Judge Gerard E.
Lynch ruled that the plaintiffs were required to allege additional facts that
35 Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1962. According to the complaint, the ILECs' "actions allegedly
included making unfair agreements with the CLECs for access to ILEC networks, providing inferior
connections to the networks, overcharging, and billing in ways designed to sabotage the CLECs'
relations with their own customers." Id.
36 Id. Conspiracy was the natural result, according to the plaintiffs, because the failure of any one
of the ILECs to prevent a CLEC in the ILEC's territory from effectively competing would be to expose
to other CLECs in other ILECs' territories the opportunity for competitive success. Id. In essence, the
plaintiffs claimed that Verizon provided inferior service to one CLEC in its territory so that Qwest
would do the same to a CLEC in that territory, thereby discouraging a second CLEC in Verizon's
territory from competing against Verizon. Id.
37 Id. The complaint also described a statement from the CEO of Qwest, Richard Notebaert, who
said that "competing in the territory of another ILEC 'might be a good way to turn a quick dollar but
that doesn't make it right."' Id.
38 Id. at 1962-63. In setting forth the grounds for relief under the Sherman Act, the complaint used
similar language: "Defendants . . . engaged in a contract, combination, or conspiracy to prevent
competitive entry in [their respective territories] by, among other things, agreeing not to compete with
one another and to stifle attempts by others to compete with them and otherwise allocating customers
and markets to one another in violation of... the Sherman Act." Id. at 1963 n.2.
39 Twombly v. Bell AtI. Corp., 313 F. Supp. 2d 174, 176 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), vacated, Twombly v.
Bell Atlantic Corp., 425 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2005).
40 Id. at 179 (quoting Theatre Enters., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., 346 U.S. 537,
541 (1954)).
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"tend[] to exclude independent self-interested conduct as an explanation for
defendants' parallel behavior." 4 1 He also held that the complaint failed to
allege facts suggesting that refraining from competing was contrary to the
ILECs' apparent economic interests and thus did not raise an inference of
conspiracy. 4 2 Judge Lynch found that district courts in the Second Circuit
required plaintiffs to "allege plus factors" to withstand a motion to dismiss
and be entitled to discovery in cases involving parallel conduct
conspiracies. 4 3 This requirement, he stated, separated complaints that
suggested a conspiracy from those that did not. 44 It also ensured that
defendants were given notice of the "'conduct which is alleged to be
conspiratorial.' 4 5
The Second Circuit reversed the judgment and ruled that the district
court had applied the wrong standard.4 6 The Second Circuit found that the
district court had "demanded far more than a short and plain statement of
the claims and the grounds upon which they rest," thus imposing a
heightened pleading standard. 4 7 In doing so, the district court violated the
explicit instruction of Swierkiewicz that "[a] requirement of greater
specificity for particular claims is a result that 'must be obtained by the
process of amending the Federal Rules, and not by judicial
interpretation.' 48 The Second Circuit then applied the "extremely
permissive" standard of Conley.49 The court noted that the plaintiffs were
required to plead facts that "include conspiracy among the realm of
'plausible' possibilities in order to survive a motion to dismiss." 50
However, it found that in order "to rule that allegations of parallel
anticompetitive conduct fail to support a plausible conspiracy claim, a court
would have to conclude that there is no set of facts that would permit a
at 179.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 188.
43 Id. at 179-80 (citing Kramer v. Pollock-Krasner Found., 890 F. Supp. 250, 255-56 (S.D.N.Y.
1995); Levitch v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 495 F. Supp. 649, 675 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)). It should be noted
that Judge Lynch found plus factors to be required only where a conspiracy was alleged on the basis of
parallel conduct. Id. at 180.
44 Twombly v. Bell Ati. Corp., 313 F. Supp. 2d 174, 180 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
45 Id. at 181 (quoting Levitch, 495 F. Supp. at 675).
46 Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 425 F.3d 99, 111 (2d Cir. 2005), rev'd, Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007).
47 Id. at 108.
48 Id. at 107 (quoting Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002)). The Second
Circuit also noted that "[tihe purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits."' Id.
(quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48 (1957)).
49 Id. at 108. The court of appeals also explicitly rejected the notion, suggested by the district court,
that antitrust cases required heightened pleading standards: "Antitrust claims are, for pleading purposes,
no different [from other claims governed by Rule 8]." See id. at 108-09.
50 Id. at 114.
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plaintiff to demonstrate that the particular parallelism asserted was the
product of collusion rather than coincidence." 5 1 The Second Circuit
declined to so conclude; therefore, it reversed the district court's
judgment. 52
The Supreme Court granted certiorari "to address the proper standard for
pleading an antitrust conspiracy through allegations of parallel conduct."5 3
The Court specifically rejected the "no set of facts" language of Conley as
the proper standard. 54 Finding that the language, as applied by the Second
Circuit, had been improperly interpreted in isolation from its original
context, the Court stated that Conley "described the breadth of opportunity
to prove what an adequate complaint claims, not the minimum standard of
adequate pleading to govern a complaint's survival." 5 5 In the Court's view,
to employ the Conley language literally as the standard would be to do
away with the requirement, set forth in Dura Pharmaceutic Inc. v.
Broudo,56 that the plaintiff show a "reasonably founded hope" of being
able to make a case before being permitted to begin the discovery phase. 57
Insofar as the well-known Conley language was employed as the standard,
the Court stated that "this famous observation has earned its retirement...
[and] is best forgotten as an incomplete, negative gloss on an accepted
pleading standard. ....58
The proper standard is one that "calls for enough fact to raise a
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of [the elements

51

Id.

52 See id. at 118-19 ("We conclude that these allegations are sufficient to 'give the defendant fair
notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests' ....
" (quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at
47)).
53 Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1963 (2007).
54 Id. at 1969 (rejecting Conley's "no set of facts" standard).
55 Id. The Court understood the language to stand for the simple proposition that "once a claim has
been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations
in the complaint." Id.
56 544 U.S. 336 (2005).
57 Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1969. It appears that, by its ruling in Twombly, the Court has
reinterpreted the meaning of "reasonably founded hope." As Justice Stevens pointed out in his dissent,
the Dura plaintiffs failed to adequately allege a necessary element, loss causation, in their private
securities fraud claim. Id. at 1984 n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In Dura Pharmaceutic,the complaint
asserted only that the prices of the securities purchased by the plaintiffs were artificially inflated and did
not speak to any connection between the defendants' alleged misrepresentation and the plaintiffs'
economic loss (or even what that loss was). Id. (citing Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo 544 U.S. 347
(2005)). Conversely, the Twombly plaintiffs did not fail altogether to plead a required element of their
claim, but (in the opinion of the majority) did so in a conclusory, insufficient manner. Id. at 1985.
58 Id. at 1969. The Court also stated that the language had "puzzl[ed] the profession for 50 years,"
suggesting that its true meaning had never been properly understood. See id. But see id. at 1978
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens stated, "[i]ndeed, today's opinion is the first by any Member of
this Court to express any doubt as to the adequacy of the Conley formulation." Id.
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of the claim]." 59 In short, a complaint must provide "enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face."60 The Court held that a § I
complaint must contain "enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest
that an agreement was made." 6 1 While the plaintiff need not "'set out in
detail the facts upon which he bases his claim,"' 62 there must be "some
factual allegation in the complaint." 63 Without this, "it is hard to see how a
claimant could satisfy the requirement of providing not only 'fair notice' of
the nature of the claim, but also 'grounds' on which the claim rests." 64 In
directly addressing what a plaintiff is required to plead in order to state a
claim under § 1 of the Sherman Act, the Court found that when a claimant
relies upon allegations of parallel conduct, those allegations "must be
65
placed in a context that raises a suggestion of a preceding agreement."
Applying this updated standard, the Court held that the complaint failed
to pass muster, as "nothing contained in the complaint invest[ed] either the
action or inaction alleged with a plausible suggestion of conspiracy." 66 In
doing so, the Court noted that it was not "apply[ing] any 'heightened'
pleading standard, nor... broaden[ing] the scope of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 9."67 The complaint was insufficient because it contained facts
68
giving rise only to a conceivable claim, not a plausible claim.
The Court's ruling appears to be almost entirely rooted in a policy-based
justification: the limitation of the high costs of litigation. As the Court
noted, "it is one thing to be cautious before dismissing an antitrust
complaint in advance of discovery, but quite another to forget that
59 Id. at 1965. Thus, in this § I Sherman Act case, the complaint was required to "raise a
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal agreement." Id.
60 Id. at 1974 (emphasis added).
61 Id. at 1965.
62 Id. at 1956 n.3 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,48 (1957)).
63 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1956 n.3 (2007).
64 Id. The Court also stated that Rule 8(a)(2) "'contemplate[s] the statement of circumstances,
occurrences, and events in support of the claim presented'...." Id. (quoting 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT
& ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1202, at 94-95 (3d ed. 2004)).
65 Id. at 1966.
66 Id. at 1971. The Court found that the allegations of parallel conduct, on which the plaintiffs
based their claim of conspiracy, was insufficient, for the resistance of competition was "only natural"
and no agreement could be inferred from such conduct. See id. Similarly, the failure to enter
neighboring markets by the defendants had "an obvious alternative explanation" - since the defendants
had been government-sanctioned monopolies until 1996, they were accustomed to "sitting tight" and
"would see their best interests in keeping to their old turf." Id. at 1972.
67 Id. at 1973 n.14. In denying any augmentation of the pleading standard, the Court attempted to
reconcile Twombly with its decision in Swierkiewicz, noting that the district court had recognized that
the use of a heightened pleading standard "'was contrary to the Federal Rules' structure of liberal
pleading requirements."' Id. at 1973 (quoting Twombly v. Bell AtI. Corp., 313 F. Supp. 2d 174, 181
(S.D.N.Y. 2003)).
68 See id. at 1974 ("Because the plaintiffs here have not nudged their claims across the line from
conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be dismissed.").
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proceeding to antitrust discovery can be expensive." 69 The Court had
previously recognized the "potential for possible abuse of the liberal
discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure" in Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores.70 In Twombly, the Court went beyond
lamenting the problems it perceived as associated with discovery; it crafted
a standard to ameliorate them.
The Court extensively detailed what it viewed as the major drawbacks of
a liberal interpretation of the pleading standard. Discovery, in the eyes of
the Court, had exploded into a massive and resource-draining
undertaking. 7 1 The Court blamed this development on the liberal regime
imposed by the Federal Rules, remarking, "[g]iven the system that we
72
have, the hope of effective judicial supervision [of discovery] is slim."
The efforts of trial judges to weed out groundless claims early in the
discovery process, and therefore keep costs to a minimum, were largely
unsuccessful, allowing the prevalence of discovery abuse to grow
unabated. 73 Under a liberal interpretation of the Rule 8(a)(2), "'j]udges
can do little about impositional discovery [because] parties control the legal
claims to be presented and conduct the discovery themselves.' 74 In
interpreting Rule 8(a)(2) as requiring a plaintiff to plead "enough facts to
69 Id. at 1966-67 (citing Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962)).
70 421 U.S. 723, 741 (1975). "[T]o the extent that [the discovery process] permits a plaintiff with a
largely groundless claim to simply take up the time of a number of other people, with the right to do so
representing an in terrorem increment of the settlement value, rather than a reasonably founded hope
that the process will reveal relevant evidence, it is a social cost rather than a benefit." Id.
71 See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1967 (2007). The Court cited one report
stating that as much as 90 percent of litigation costs arose out of discovery expenses in cases where
discovery was actively employed. Id. (citing Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 192
F.R.D. 340, 357 (2000)). Such expense, in the eyes of the Court, was likely in the case at hand. Id. at
1967 n.6.
[D]etermining whether some illegal agreement may have taken place between unspecified persons
at different ILECs (each a multibillion dollar corporation with legions of management level
employees) at some point over seven years is a sprawling, costly, and hugely time-consuming
undertaking not easily susceptible to the kind of line drawing and case management the dissent
envisions.
Id. (emphasis added). See The Supreme Court, 2006 Term: Leading Case: Federal Jurisdiction and
Procedure- Civil Procedure- Pleading Standards, 121 HARV. L. REv. 305, 312 (2007). This article
describes the costly nature of the discovery process.
72 Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1967 n.6 (noting that the difficulty in supervising discovery has
contributed to the costliness of discovery).
73 See id. at 1967. "It is no answer to say that a claim just shy of a plausible entitlement to relief
can, if groundless, be weeded out early in the discovery process through 'careful case management,'
given the common lament that the success of judicial supervision in checking discovery abuse has been
on the modest side." Id. "'The portions of the Rules of Civil Procedure calling on judges to trim back
excessive demands, therefore, have been, and are doomed to be, hollow. We cannot prevent what we
cannot detect; we cannot detect what we cannot define; we cannot define 'abusive' discovery except in
theory, because in practice we lack essential information."' Id. at 1967 n.6 (quoting Easterbrook, supra
note 4, at 638-39).
74 Id. at 1967 (quoting Easterbrook, supranote 4, at 638).
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state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face," 75 the Court took to heart
a decades-old decision of the Seventh Circuit, Car Carriers,Inc. v. Ford
Motor Co.,76 which stated that "the costs of modem federal antitrust
litigation and the increasing caseload of the federal courts counsel against
sending the parties into discovery when there is no reasonable likelihood
that the plaintiffs can construct a claim from the events related in the
complaint." 77
It is this justification proffered by the Court that is most troubling to
Justice Stevens in his dissent, the bulk of which is spent noting the
problems with the Court's policy-centric justification of stricter pleading
standards. Terming the Court's decision as a "dramatic departure from
settled procedural law," 78 Justice Stevens explained the history of Rule 8,
which he described as the "starting point" 79 of a liberal notice pleading
system designed to ensure that the merits of a claim would be sorted out
during a "flexible pretrial process and, as appropriate, through the crucible
of trial." 80 Justice Stevens did recognize that discovery can often be costly
in complex cases, but argued that such cost was a necessary evil of notice
pleading and did not justify a heightened pleading burden. 81
The Court, Justice Stevens explained, had given into the temptation to
ignore the Federal Rules' liberal provisions by using special pleading in
order to bring about speedier dispositions of claims. 82 Despite its good
75 Id. at 1974.
76 745 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir. 1984). There, a transporter filed suit against Ford for Sherman antitrust
violations, and later tried to sue on the same facts for Commerce Act and Rico violations. Id. at 1104.
77 Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1967 (quoting Car Carriers,Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101,
1106 (7th Cir. 1984)).
78 Id. at 1975 (Stevens, J., dissenting). As Justice Stevens noted, the Court had previously rejected
attempts by lower courts to craft more stringent pleading standards, even where the higher standard was
meant to curb litigation costs. Id. Justice Stevens argued that the Court's holding in Leatherman had
"rebuffed the Fifth Circuit's effort to craft a standard for pleading municipal liability that accounted
for
'the enormous expense involved today in litigation."' Id. at 1981 (quoting Leatherman v. Tarrant
County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 954 F.2d 1054, 1057 (1992)). Furthermore, in
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 506 (2002), the Supreme Court held that the Second Circuit
erred in requiring plaintiff to plead a prima facie case of employment discrimination.
79 Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1976 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 514).
80 Id.
81 The Court's new pleading standard was especially inappropriate in an antitrust case, according
to Justice Stevens, in light of Congress's clear intention to encourage private enforcement of the law by
authorizing the recovery of treble damages by successful plaintiffs. Id. at 1983. Justice Stevens
reasoned that "[i]t
is therefore more, not less, important in antitrust cases to resist the urge to engage in
armchair economics at the pleading stage." Id.
82 See id. at 1983-84. In his defense of the notice-pleading regime, Justice Stevens quoted the
writings of Judge Charles E. Clark, whom Stevens described as one of the "principal draftsmen" of the
Federal Rules. Id. at 1976. In the same year that the Supreme Court decided Conley, Judge Clark wrote
the following:
I fear that every age must learn its lesson that special pleading cannot be made to do the service of
trial and that live issues between active litigants are not to be disposed of or evaded on the paper
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intentions, the Court's new standard was contrary to the very essence of the
Federal Rules: "that pretrial matters will be settled through a flexible
process of give and take.., not by having trial judges screen allegations
for the plausibility vel non without requiring an answer from the
defendant." 83 The Court had previously instructed parties seeking to
change pleading standards that "their remedy was to seek to amend the
Federal rules - not [the Court's] interpretation of them." 84 In redefining the
standard of Rule 8(a), the Court was, in Justice Stevens's eyes, ignoring its
prior admonitions and effectively amending the Federal Rules by changing
85
their meaning to conform to a particular view of public policy.
II. THE TWOMBLY STANDARD'S TWO LEVELS OF CONFUSION
A. What does "Plausible"Mean?
Despite the Court's claim that its decision merely clarified a
misconception and was not announcing a change in the interpretation of
Rule 8,86 the abrogation of the Conley language in favor of a requirement
of "enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal
pleadings, i.e., the formalistic claims of the parties. Experience has found no quick and easy short
cut for trials in cases generally and antitrust cases in particular.
Id. at 1983 (quoting Charles E. Clark, Special Pleading in the "Big Case"? in PROCEDURE - THE
HANDMAID OF JUSTICE 147, 148 (Charles Alan Wright & Harry M. Reasoner eds., 1965)).
83 See id. at 1988 n.13 (emphasis added); see also Vincent v. City Colls. of Chi., 485 F.3d 919, 924
(7th Cir. 2007) ("Although we appreciate the pressure that a heavy flux of litigation creates, and the
temptation to get rid at the earliest opportunity of claims that do not seem likely to pan out, Rule
12(b)(6) does not serve this function."); Easterbrook, supra note 4, at 645 ("If we are to rule out judgedirected discovery, however, we must be prepared to pay the piper. Part of the price [of notice pleading]
is the high cost of unnecessary discovery - impositional and otherwise.").
84 Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1988 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534
U.S. 506, 515 (2002); Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 595 (1998); Leatherman v. Tarrant County
Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993)); see Posting of Ted Frank to
http://www.pointoflaw.com/archives/003245.php (Nov. 27, 2006, 14:34 EST) [hereinafter Posting of
Ted Frank] ("[T]he Second Circuit's decision is horrible public policy: bare-bones antitrust complaints
permit hugely expensive fishing expeditions with no consequences to the plaintiffs who bring the case,
as numerous amicus briefs point out. But the respondents are correct that this counterproductive result
is precisely what Rule 8 commands. The problem here is with the law, not with the court decisions. This
is not a place for the Supreme Court to intervene as judges-but the Supreme Court can fix the problem
with the rules under their authority granted to it by Congress under 28 U.S.C. § 2072, and Congress can
also step in.").
85 See Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1989 (Stevens, J., dissenting). "The transparent policy concern that
drives the decision is the interest in protecting antitrust defendants - who in this case are some of the
wealthiest corporations in our economy - from the burdens of pretrial discovery .. .[T]hat concern
[does] not provide an adequate justification for this law-changing decision." Id.
86 See id. at 1973 n.14 ("In reaching this conclusion, we do not apply any 'heightened' pleading
standard... which can only be accomplished 'by the process of amending the Federal Rules, and not by
judicial interpretation."' (quoting Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 515)). But see id. at 1984 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("While the majority assures us that it is not applying any 'heightened' pleading standard..
. I have a difficult time understanding its opinion any other way.").
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evidence" does reflect a change, at least in practice, in how motions to
dismiss should be considered. 87 The Twombly formulation focuses a trial
court's attention on the plausibility of the allegations, asking the judge to
differentiate those claims that are plausibly suggested from those that are
merely conceivable by looking at the factual basis for those claims. 88 This
begs the threshold question: as used by the Court, exactly what does
"plausible" mean? And, once that question is answered, it still must be
determined how a complaint's factual basis is to be scrutinized in deciding
whether the allegations are plausible.
The Court's meaning in its use of "plausible" is ambiguous. The term is
not precisely defined in the opinion, but some rough guideposts can be
gleaned from the text by implication from what the term does not mean.
Most importantly, "plausible" means something greater than
"conceivable," 89 but less than "probable." 90 A plausible claim does not
require "heightened fact pleading of specifics," as the standard of Rule 9(b)
requires, 9 1 but it does seem to require pleading of some specific facts, such
as when and where the purportedly illegal actions of the defendant
occurred.9 2 While these facts do draw some distinctions between what is
87 Indeed, as this paper notes, while commentators disagree as to the meaning and effect of
Twombly, they are nearly unanimous in holding the belief that Twombly is a marked change from prior
precedent and will have a substantial effect on motion practice in the federal courts. See Dodson article,
supra note 21, at 137-38 (noting that Twombly is a "significant statement from the Court from a
proceduralist prospective" and that the circuit courts "will now have to change their pleading
jurisprudence"); see also Gregory F. Joseph, Pleading Requirements, 30 NAT'L L.J. 1,at 13 col. 1
(2007) (arguing that Twombly "revolutionized pleading rules"); Janet L. McDavid & Eric Stock, 'Bell
Atlantic v. Twombly', 29 NAT'L L.J. 47, at 12 col. 1 (2007) (stating that Twombly "marks a clear and
visible departure from the liberal federal pleading standards"). But see Dodson article,supra note 21, at
139 (noting Professor Doff's suggestion that Twombly might be interpreted as a re-affirmation of the
"rule that plaintiffs can plead themselves out of court" by failing to plead alternative theories of liability
(citing Dorf on Law, The End of Notice Pleading?,http://www.michaeldorf.org/2007/05/end-of-noticepleading.html (May 24, 2007, 07:35 EST))).
88 See Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1974. "Because the plaintiffs here have not nudged their claims
across from the line from conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be dismissed." Id. "[Tihe
plaintiff must allege facts 'plausibly' suggesting the existence of a conspiracy." Dodson article, supra
note 21, at 136.
89 Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1974.
90 Id. at 1965 ("Asking for plausible grounds to infer an agreement does not impose a probability
requirement at the pleading stage ....).
91 Id. at 1974 (highlighting the requirement of "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face," rather than heightened fact pleading of specifics).
92 Id. at 1971 n. 10. "Whereas the model form alleges that the defendant struck the plaintiff with his
car while plaintiff was crossing a particular highway at a specified date and time, the complaint here
furnishes no clue as to which of the four ILECs . . . supposedly agreed, or when and where [it] took
place." Id. (emphasis added). The following exchange gives insight into the apparent important of
"when and where" the agreement took place, at least in the eyes of one justice:
JUSTICE SCALIA: "The agreement happens at one moment in time."
MR. RICHARDS [counsel for the plaintiffs]: "Oh, it could happen in many moments."
JUSTICE SCALIA: "Meetings of the minds, meeting of the minds. I used to [t]each
Contracts. Meeting of the minds at one moment in time, okay."
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plausible and what is not, a definitive meaning of the word, as used by the
93
Court, cannot be reached.
The failure of the Court to define the term "plausible" clearly has serious
implications for one trying to understand the gravity of the change caused
by Twombly. The decision reaffirms Swierkiewicz, which held that the
allegations in a complaint must be taken as true in determining a motion to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).94 However, the "re-affirmation comes with
the caution" that the plaintiff must "show that he is 'plausibly' entitled to
relief."9 5 The plausibility requirement, therefore, reflects an increased sense
of scrutiny towards complaints. Yet, since Twombly does not "apply any
'heightened' pleading standard," 96 this increased scrutiny cannot exceed
the heightened strict scienter pleading requirement of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA").97 Thus, a plausible claim can be one
that is less likely than not to raise a claim to relief. However, exactly what
Transcript of Oral Argument at 29, Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (No. 05-1126), available at 2006 WL
3422211. Also, Form 9, the model complaint for negligence, alleges the defendant's liability as follows:
"On June 1, 1936, in a public highway called Boylston Street in Boston, Massachusetts, defendant
negligently drove a motor vehicle against plaintiff who was then crossing the highway." FED. R. Ctv. P.
Form 9. The Court's reference to Form 9 as a model which the Twombly plaintiffs could have followed
is particularly puzzling. While the "when and where" of the occurrence of a motor vehicle accident is
undeniably crucial to the case, the "when and where" of the formation of an agreement in restraint of
trade is not as crucial. Indeed, it is hard to see how "where" an agreement between the ILECs was
entered into would be important to the case as long as the very existence of the agreement can be
reliably proven otherwise, whereas the location and time of an automobile accident are nearly always
important factors in determining whether the defendant was negligent (and whether the plaintiff
contributed to the damages through his own lack of care). Also, as Justice Stevens' dissent notes, the
aversion of Form 9 that the defendant was negligent is a "bare allegation." Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1977
(Stevens, J., dissenting). In contrast, the Twombly plaintiffs' allegation of an illegal agreement between
the ILECs is supported by the description of the ILECs' parallel conduct. Id. at 1962. If Form 9 asserts
no facts speaking to negligence and is not too conclusory to be plausible, it is hard to see how the
Twombly complaint, which alleges some (albeit far from dispositive) facts, is implausible.
93 At least one commentator has called Twombly 's plausibility standard "notice-plus," meaning that
the complaint must give the defendant notice of the claims asserted by the plaintiff as well as some
factual matter going beyond fair notice that makes the claims "plausible." See Dodson article, supra
note 21, at 138; see also Posting of Scott Dodson to Civil Procedure Professor Blog,
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/civpro/2007/05/profiscott-dods.html (May 21, 2007) [hereinafter
Dodson blog]. While this interpretation is helpful to the extent that it describes plausibility as going
beyond simple notice of the claim, it still is quite ambiguous, for it sheds no light on exactly how much
"plus" information a complaint must contain to be plausible.
94 See Blumstein, supra note 9, at 14 ("Good news for plaintiffs defending against a motion to
dismiss: Twombly re-affirms the holding in Swierkiewic ... The allegations in the complaint must still
be taken as true, as has long been required of courts in deciding Rule 12(b)(6) motions.").
95 See id.
96 See Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1973 n.14 (2007) (discussing the pleading
standard and the level of facts a plaintiff must plead in certain cases); see also Blumstein, supra note 9,
at 13 (highlighting the holding in Twombly, which does not require a heightened pleading standard).
97 See Joseph, supra note 87, at 13 col. I. As the Court held just weeks after its decision in
Twombly, "the PSLRA is satisfied by an inference of equal plausibility." Id. (citing Tellabs, Inc. v.
Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499 (2007)). Since the intent of the PSLRA is to heighten
pleading standards in certain kinds of securities cases above the normal Rule 8 standard, the standard of
Twombly must be lower than that of Tellabs. Id.
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degree of unlikelihood will cause a claim to slip from plausible to
conceivable remains unclear. 98
Given the vague definition of the proper meaning of "plausible," it
stands to reason that the Court envisioned a more active role for trial judges
as gate-keepers at the pre-discovery stage. 99 In Associated General
Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State Council of
Carpenters,lOO the Court had previously remarked in a footnote that "a
district court must retain the power to insist upon some specificity in
pleading before allowing a potentially massive factual controversy to
proceed."lOl The Twombly standard appears to be an attempt to give teeth
to that statement by making it easier for a trial court to dismiss a
complaint.102 As Justice Scalia hinted during the Twombly oral arguments,
the Court seemed to be seeking a standard that, if anything, would err on
the side of dismissing too many suits, rather than too few, so as to avoid the
possibility for prolonged costly discovery when possible.103 As noted
98 Thinking of this problem numerically may elucidate the uncertainty. The standard of Tellabs is
50% plausibility ("an inference of equal plausibility"). The standard of the rejected reading of the
Conley language ("complaint shall not be dismissed unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can
prove no set of facts in support of his claim") would seem to be anything above 0%. The Twombly
standard must therefore be a degree of likelihood more than 0% but less than 50%, which certainly
leaves a wide margin for error in interpretation. Twombly does suggest that there is a level of mere
"conceivability," which seems to indicate that there is some level from 0% to some higher likelihood in
which complaints have not achieved plausibility. However, from the text of the Court's decision, there
is no way to determine exactly where the line between "conceivable" and "plausible" lies.
99 See Edward M. Spiro, The Supreme Court's Pleading Trilogy, 238 N.Y. L.J. 23, at 3 (2007)
("By eschewing Conley v. Gibson's 'no set of facts' language [and] articulating the plausibility standard
for pleadings under Rule 8(a)(2) ....
the Court clearly envisions a more robust role for lower courts
reviewing the sufficiency of pleadings in complex cases.") (emphasis added); see also Wendy N. Davis,
Just the Facts, But More of Them: An Antitrust Ruling Is Proving To Be a Bigger Deal Than Expected,
A. B. A. J., Oct. 2007, available at http://abajoumal.com/magazine/just-thefacts but more of them (noting that much is left to the discretion of trial judges).
To 459 U.S. 519 (1983).
101 Id. at 528 n.17. The Court in Associated Gen. Contractors also expressed its concern that the
"rule" of Conley was being stretched too far as to allow a weak claim of coercion, the nature of which
was unspecified, to withstand a motion to dismiss in an action for treble damages brought under § 4 of
the Clayton Act. See id. at 528 nn. 15 & 17. Interestingly, it was Justice Stevens, who strongly dissented
in Twombly, who wrote for the Court in Associated Gen. Contractors.
102 Just weeks before Twombly was handed down, Chief Judge Frank H. Easterbrook, to whose
academic works the Court cited to extensively in Twombly, wrote the following description of the
likelihood a district court's dismissal of a complaint: "a judicial order dismissing a complaint because
the plaintiff did not plead facts has a short half-life. 'Any decision declaring this complaint is deficient
because it does not allege X is a candidate for summary reversal, unless X is on the list in Fed. R. Civ.
P. 9(b)."' Vincent v. City Colls. of Chi., 485 F.3d 919, 923 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Kolupa v. Roselle
Park Dist., 438 F.3d 713, 715 (7th Cir. 2006)). The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's
dismissal of the claim being discussed. Id. at 926.
103 Posting of Jason Harrow to SCOTUSblog, http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/commentary-andanalysis/recap-bell-atlantic-v-twombly-on-1127/#more-4781 (Nov. 29, 2006, 17:55 EST). "Justice
Scalia made clear that he would err on the side of dismissing suits, believing that the time and expense
of discovery will lead to meritless suits brought to force defendants to settle." Id. See Transcript of Oral
Argument, supra note 92, at 48-49. Justice Scalia, discussing the prospect of allowing the Twombly
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above, the Court acknowledged that traditional methods of case
management were ineffective, as they failed to allow district judges to
dismiss meritless claims prior to discovery.' 04 A "plausibility" standard
seems to be a way to provide trial judges with the flexibility of discretion
necessary to weed out weak claims sooner rather than later.
Such an approach, however, has the negative effect of promoting
disparate and inconsistent results. Prior to Twombly, it was wellestablished that only the weakest and most patently groundless claims
faced dismissal at the pleadings stage.1 05 The Twombly Court gave trial
judges increased authority to dismiss claims at the outset through a vague
and largely undefined standard, rather than after the commencement of
discovery.106 In doing so, the Court sacrificed a large extent of that
predictability in pursuit of diminished litigation costs. As such, the Court
made a momentous value judgment: that a cost savings in the discovery
stage does more to protect the integrity of the justice system than does a
clear standard that ensured almost entirely consistent results.
Two decisions from the summer of 2007, EEOC v. Concentra Health
Services, Inc. 107 and Goldstein v. Pataki,108 demonstrate the disparate
results that will flow from Twombly's vague plausibility standard.
Goldstein involved the planned development of a large section of
Brooklyn, New York, into office and residential towers, a sports arena, and

plaintiffs the opportunity to conduct discovery, asked the following of plaintiffs' counsel: "How much
money do you think it would have cost the defendants by then to assemble all of the documents that
you're going to be interested in looking at? How many buildings will have to be rented to store those
documents and how many years will be expended in, in gathering all the materials?" Id.
104 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1967 (2007) (quoting Dura Pharm., Inc. v.
Broudo 544 U.S. 347 (2005)). "Probably, then, it is only by taking care to require allegations that reach
the level suggesting conspiracy that we can hope to avoid ... discovery in cases with no 'reasonably
founded hope that the [discovery] process will reveal relevant evidence' to support a § 1 claim." Id.
(quoting Dura, 544 U.S. at 347). The Court commented that pre-Twombly plaintiffs were required only
to file "a sketchy complaint" in order to reach discovery. Id. See A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility
Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 452 (2008). The Court was concerned about heavy judicial caseloads
and the danger of sending parties into discovery when there is no reasonable likelihood that the
plaintiffs can construct a claim from the events related in the complaint. Id.
105 See Vincent, 485 F.3d at 924 ("Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is reserved for complaints that do
not state legally cognizable claims, including the situation in which the plaintiff pleads himself out of
court by making allegations sufficient to defeat the suit."); see also Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45
(1957) (holding that dismissal is only proper where it "appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove
no set of facts in support his claim").
106 Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1965 (stating that a complaint must contain some set of facts in support
of the claim). See Goldstein v. Pataki, 488 F. Supp. 2d 254, 286 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (dismissing the
complaint because the plaintiffs did not set forth a set of facts supporting a plausible claim).
107 496 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2007) (applying the Twombly decision to dismiss a claim based
upon unfair employment practices).
108 488 F. Supp. 2d at 286 (applying the Twombly decision to dismiss a claim based on the Fifth
Amendment Takings Clause).
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a hotel.10 9 The plaintiffs, each owning or renting real estate in the affected
area, brought suit against various state and city officials and entities and the
private developer contracted to build the development project in an attempt
to prevent the condemnation of their properties.l"O Specifically, the
plaintiffs alleged that the condemnation procedures to be used in
conjunction with the development project violated the public use
requirement of the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause. II Their complaint
contained allegations that the development project had the "sole purpose"
of conferring a private benefit,' 2 and even if there was some purpose to
benefit the public, it was merely a pretext, secondary to the project's true
purpose of benefiting the developer.113
The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted.ll 4 In granting the motion to
dismiss, Judge Nicholas G. Garaufis applied Twombly and found that the
"plaintiffs ha[d] not set forth facts supporting a plausible claim of
an
unconstitutional taking."1 1 5 According to the decision, the complaint
conceded that some public benefit, while less than what the defendants
claimed, would result from the project. 116 Therefore, their claim that the
"sole purpose" of the project was to confer a private benefit was "baseless

109 Id. at 256. The controversial Atlantic Yards Arena and Development Project is planned to cover
twenty-two acres of largely blighted land in an attempt to revitalize the economy of the surrounding
area. Id. The asserted public purposes, as found by the court, included the elimination of blight in the
area through the construction of a sports and entertainment arena, affordable housing, office space,
"community facility spaces," a Long Island Railroad depot facility, and "environmental remediation
of
the Project site". Id. at 258.
110 Id. at 258 (arguing that seizure of their land violated the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause).
111 Id. at 278 (stating that the "for public use" provision is not satisfied); U.S. CONST. amend. V
(announcing that private property shall not "be taken for public use, without just compensation").
112 See Goldstein, 488 F. Supp. 2d at 286 ("Plaintiffs argue that the uses offered to justify the
Project... are chimerical because (1) the Project will generate no or minimal economic benefits, (2) the
Project will not create jobs, (3) the area to be condemned is not blighted, and (4) the Project will not
materially increase available affordable housing.").
113 Id. at 287-88 ("[Plaintiffs] also claim that any benefits to the public are 'secondary and
incidental to the benefit that inures to [the developer]' and that 'Defendants' desire to confer a private
benefit to [the developer] was a substantial, motivating factor in Defendants' decision to seize
Plaintiffs' property and transfer it to [the developer]."').
114 Goldstein, 488 F. Supp. 2d at 278. The defendants also claimed that the court should abstain
from hearing the case under Burford v. Sun Oil Co, 319 U.S. 315 (1943), on the ground that timely and
adequate state-court review of the action of a state administrative agency was available to deal with
difficult questions regarding state law and state policy. Goldstein, 488 F. Supp. 2d at 260-61. The court
rejected this claim and declined to abstain. Id. at 278. The court also summarily rejected the defendants'
claim that the case was unripe and should be dismissed under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
Id. at 278.
115 Goldstein,488 F. Supp. 2d at 288.
116 See id. at 286-87 ("[Allthough Plaintiffs allege that the net gain in tax revenues will be lower
than Defendants have predicted, they do not allege that there will be no net gain.").
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and may be rejected even at this early stage of the litigation.""l 7 Judge
Garaufis also found the "pretext" claim to be without merit.1 1 8 Since the
plaintiffs only claimed that the asserted purposes of public benefit were
dubious and did not provide facts establishing a motive for the
governmental defendants to bestow any private benefit, he held that the
complaint did not present a plausible right to relief.1 9 Therefore, "even if
Plaintiffs could prove every allegation in the Amended Complaint, a
reasonablejuror would not be able to conclude" that the defendants had
the necessary improper motive in order to win on their claim.120 Thus,
Judge Garaufis identified a plausible allegation as one that would "permit a
reasonable juror to conclude" that the defendants' actions were illegal. 121
The Twombly standard as applied in Goldstein is a high burden for a
plaintiff. In effect, he must plead facts establishing a prima facie case in
his complaint or have his claim or claims dismissed. 122 This interpretation
therefore dangerously blurs the distinction between a motion to dismiss and
a motion for summary judgment.123 As the Supreme Court held in
117 Id at 286.
118 Id.at288.
119 Id. at 278. The plaintiffs had alleged favoritism in determining the area to be condemned was
evidenced by the incredibly short and apparently rigged bidding process. See Amended Complaint at
49-82, Goldstein v. Pataki, 488 F. Supp. 2d 254 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (No. 06-CV-5827). After the
developer had made significant plans over several years, including an offer to buy the New Jersey Nets
and move the professional basketball team to Brooklyn to play in the planned arena, the complaint
stated that others were given just 42 days to submit proposals for purchase of the development rights to
the area. Even though another bidder has submitted an offer for $150 million to buy the site, that bid
was rejected in favor of the developer's $100 million bid. Id. at
49-82.
120 Goldstein, 488 F. Supp. 2d at 288 (emphasis added). Under Kelo v. City of New Haven, 545
U.S. 469, 278 (2005), a plaintiff must show that the "public purposes offered in support" of the taking
are "mere pretexts for an actual purpose to bestow a private benefit" to establish a violation of the
Takings Clause. Goldstein, 488 F. Supp. 2d at 288.
121 See Goldstein, 488 F. Supp. 2d at 290 ("Plaintiffs' allegations are not plausible grounds to infer
that the asserted public uses of the Project are 'palpably without reasonable foundation' . . . Plaintiffs'
allegations, if proven, would not permit a reasonable juror to conclude that the 'sole purpose' of the
Project is to confer a private benefit. Neither would those allegations permit a reasonable juror to
conclude that the purposes offered in support of the Project are 'mere pretexts' for an actual purpose to
confer a private benefit on [the developer].").
122 See id. at 286. Assuming that Judge Garaufis properly took the facts of the complaint to be true
in deciding the motion, it follows that in finding that the assertion that the public defendants' desired to
confer a benefit on the private developer was supported by only a conclusory allegation and did not rise
to the level of plausibility, see id at 288-89, he implicitly found that the assertion of a rigged bidding
process was not sufficient evidence plausibly suggesting an improper motive on the part of the
governmental defendants. In other words, it was so unlikely that the plaintiffs would be able to show
that an improper motive led to the questionable bidding procedures that the further litigation would be
useless. This seems hard to reconcile with the proposition that a complaint serves only to give the
defendant and the court notice of the nature of the claim, but rather more in line with a view that the
plaintiff must establish a prima facie right to relief.
123 Justice Stevens addressed just this issue in his Twombly dissent. See Bell At. Corp. v.
Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1983 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Everything today's majority says
would therefore make perfect sense if it were ruling on a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment and the
evidence included nothing more than the Court has described."); see also Richard A. Epstein, Access to
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Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,124 a case is to be
dismissed on summary judgment if there is "genuine issue of material
fact" left to be determined.1 25 The nonmoving party must present "specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial" to survive summary
judgment.126 In Goldstein, this is essentially what the court required of the
plaintiffs, for it is only by a showing of facts that could convince a
127
reasonable jury that there can be a "genuine issue of material fact."
While it may be presumed that there remains some difference between the
motion to dismiss standard and the summary judgment standard under this
interpretation, it is hard to imagine what that might be. 128 While it seems
more likely that the court misapplied the plausibility standard by requiring
too much to be pleaded by the plaintiff, the very fact that Twombly could be
read in such a manner as to require that a complaint provide enough facts to
essentially establish a prima facie case demonstrates the likelihood of
widely disparate results arising from the plausibility standard.
On the other end of the spectrum is Concentra.129 In this case, the
Seventh Circuit was faced with a retaliation claim brought under Title VII
on behalf of an employee allegedly discharged after reporting a sexual
affair between his supervisor and another employee.1 30 The complaint
broadly described the alleged wrongdoing on the part of the employer,
asserting that the aggrieved employee told the defendant's Director of
Human Resources that "his female supervisor gave a male subordinate,
Justice: The Social Responsibility of Lawyers: Bell Atlantic v. Twombly: How Motions to Dismiss
Become (Disguised) Summary Judgments, 25 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 61, 82 (2007) (stating that the
Twombly Court "treated the defendant's motion to dismiss as though it set up a 'mini-summary
judgment').
124 475 U.S. 574 (1986) (holding that a grant of summary judgment was appropriate against an
electronic product company alleging conspiracy where the respondent did not present factual evidence
of a motive for the petitioner to conspire).
125 Id. at 585-86 (explaining that the respondents needed to establish a genuine issue of material
fact to survive a summary judgment motion); see FED. R. CIv. P. 56 (requiring that "judgment sought
should be rendered if... there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law").
126 Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting FED. R. CIv. P. 56); see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986) (finding that the correct standard for granting summary judgment requires
a lack of genuine, material facts with regard to the evidentiary standards that apply to a particular case,
such as failing to show evidence of actual malice in a defamation action such that a reasonable jury
could not reach more than one decision).
127 See generally Goldstein, 488 F. Supp. 2d at 286-90 (requiring facts that would support prima
facie plausibility of the plaintiff's claims).
128 Judge Garaufis did indicate that the plaintiffs did not have to prove their claims to survive the
motion to dismiss. See id. at 290. Proof, of course, is also not required at the summary judgment stage.
See Spencer, supra note 104, at 486.
129 EEOC v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d 773 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that an employee
filing an equal opportunity claim must plead specific facts pertaining to the offensive workplace
conduct).
130 Id.at 775.
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with whom she was having an inappropriate sexual relationship,
preferential treatment over similarly situated employees with respect to his
employment."131 The complaint also alleged that the plaintiff was
terminated in retaliation for reporting the relationship. 3 2 After the initial
complaint was dismissed without prejudice by the district court, 133 the
EEOC filed an amended complaint that provided even less information,
asserting only that the defendant had engaged in unlawful employment
practices when it retaliated against the defendant by issuing him negative
evaluations and later terminating him.134 The amended complaint was also
dismissed, this time with prejudice.135
On appeal to the Seventh Circuit, Judge Richard D. Cudahy applied
Twombly and found that the decision imposed "two easy-to-clear
hurdles."1 36 All that is needed to state a claim was (1) "sufficient detail to
give the defendant 'fair notice of what ...the claim is and the grounds
upon which it rests,"1 37 and (2) allegations that "plausibly suggest that the
plaintiff has a right to relief, raising that possibility above a 'speculative
level."1 38 The complaint was dismissed, as the plaintiffs failure to
"provide some specific description of [the protected] conduct beyond the
mere fact that it is protected" was fatal to his allegation of illegal retaliation
on account of protected conduct.' 39
However, Judge Cudahy interpreted Twombly far differently than Judge
Garaufis had in Goldstein and found an entirely different standard arising
131 Id.
132 Id. (explaining that after Horn reported to Concentra's Director of Human Resources that
Concentra was giving a male subordinate with whom she shared an inappropriate sexual relationship
preferential treatment over other employees, Concentra responded by firing Horn).
133 See EEOC v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., No. 05 C 1109, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26926, at
*1 (N.D. 111.
Nov. 3, 2005). After filing a complaint against Concentra alleging that it discriminated
against Horn by retaliating against him in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the court granted Concentra's motion to dismiss. Id.
134 See Concentra, 496 F.3d at 776. The entire portion of the complaint laying out the nature of the
claim read as follows:
Since at least 2001, Defendant has engaged in unlawful employment practices at its Elk Grove
location, in violation of Section 704(a) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). Such unlawful
employment practices include, but are not limited to, retaliating against Horn [the plaintiff,] after he
opposed conduct in the workplace that he objectively and reasonably believed in good faith violated
Title VII by reporting the conduct to Concentra's Director of Human Resources. Concentra's
retaliation includes, but is not limited to, issuing Horn unwarranted negative evaluations and
terminating him. Id.
135 EEOC v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., No. 05 C 1109, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6715, at *3 (N.D.
III. July 12, 2006). The district court noted that the "amended complaint was even more vague than the
original." Id.
136 Concentra,496 F.3d at 776.
137 Id. (quoting Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964 (2007)).
138 Id. (citing Twombly, 127 S.Ct., at 1965).
139 Jd.at780-81.
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from Twombly. Judge Cudahy noted that "requiring a plaintiff to plead
detailed facts interferes" with the Federal Rules' goal "to ensure that claims
40
are determined on their merits rather than through missteps in pleading."1
In a footnote, he stated that Twombly did not alter the standard of detail
required to give notice of the claim.141 Instead, Judge Cudahy was of the
view that Twombly reaffirmed the proposition that the Federal Rules do not
encourage plaintiffs to disguise the nature of their claims. 142 He found that
pleading facts were not required under the liberal notice pleading regime
for two reasons: (1) given the "astronomical" number of factual details
potentially relevant to a case, "most details are more efficiently learned
through the flexible discovery process,"' 143 and (2) since plaintiffs
"sometimes have a right to relief without knowing every factual detail
supporting its right," requiring the pleading of facts "would improperly
1
deny the plaintiff the opportunity to prove its claim" in those situations. 44
As long as the complaint provided "what few facts can be easily provided
and will clearly be helpful," it would be sufficient under the Federal
Rules. 145
Two judges, purporting to apply the same standard, reached widely
disparate results. Indeed, Concentra'spermissive take on Twombly seems
to be the polar opposite of the Goldstein view. Judge Cudahy's view
effectively renders Twombly a toothless reaffirmation of the Conley
standard (albeit an abrogation of the oft-quoted "no set of facts"
language).14 6 On the other hand, Judge Garaufis's interpretation would
140 Id. at 779 (quoting 2 JAMES W. MOORE, ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 8.04 (3d ed.
2006)).
141 Id. at 782 n.4 ("Even assuming that [Twombly] changed the level of detail required by notice
pleading, which seems doubtful, we hold that the amended complaint failed to provide adequate notice
under precedents that long preceded [Twombly] .... ). But see id. at 783 (Flaum, J., concurring) ("I
respectfully disagree, however, that the complaint was insufficient under our pre-[Twombly] case
law.").
142 Id. at 780 (explaining that "[t]he rules do not require unnecessary detail, but neither do they
promote vagueness or reward deliberate obfuscation.").
143 Id. at 779-80 (citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512-13 (2002)).
144 See id. at 780.
145 Id. Judge Cudahy's reference to facts that "can be easily provided" is also noteworthy, for it
would seem that the Twombly plaintiffs pleaded facts that could easily be provided (that the defendants
had engaged in parallel conduct) and expected to use discovery to find more definitive evidence of an
illegal agreement. Id. If Concentra is to be understood as to ensure plaintiffs are not penalized for not
pleading facts they do not know, the case would largely undercut the Twombly policy of requiring more
of a plaintiff. As discussed below, the apparently heightened standard of Twombly pressures a plaintiff
to engage in fact-finding prior to filing a complaint. Requiring only that "a plaintiff.., plead what few
facts can be easily provided," id., would seem to be contrary to this policy, as the plaintiff would have
an incentive to refrain from fact-finding until discovery, at which point the cost burden of discovery
would fall, completely or in part, on the defendant.
146 See Nathan T. Kipp, Pleading in the Seventh Circuit After Bell Atlantic "Fact, " Notice," or
Otherwise?, 96 ILL. B.J. 82, 85 (2008) (discussing the court's opinion that Twombly requires plaintiffs
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seem to heighten the standard of Rule 8(a)(2) to that of summary judgment.
The very fact that such disparate results can be reached by two federal
judges writing just two months apart 47 demonstrates the substantial
uncertainty about the definition of the Twombly standard and of where the
line between "plausibility" and "conceivability" lies.148
B. When is the StandardApplicable?
The indeterminate scope of the standard and its bare definition is further
evidence that the Court has envisioned a more active role for judges as
gatekeepers at the pleadings stage. 149 Just as the vague "plausibility"
standard gives trial judges significant leeway as to whether or not to
dismiss claims it considers weak, the type of case to which the standard
will apply is also vague. While the court is unclear as to the applicability
of the standard, there is evidence that a broad, but not universal, application
of the Twombly standard is intended.
The Twombly ruling twice purports to limit itself to the discrete issue of
the proper pleading standard in a class action brought under § 1 of the
Sherman Act.150 However, even a cursory glance at the text of the opinion
and the surrounding contextual circumstances of the case reveals that the
newly formulated standard will be applied to cases outside of the antitrust
realm.151 Three major aspects of Twombly support this view: (1) the
to plead minimal facts, a requirement that captures the mood of Conley); see also Daniel Patrick
Jackson, A New Federal Pleading Standard?, 22 CHI. B. Ass'N REC. 46, 49 (2008) (noting the Seventh
Circuit's interpretation of Twombly may not be a great departure from the previous interpretation of
notice pleading).
147 Concentra was decided on August 3, 2007. Concentra, 496 F.3d 773. Goldstein had been
handed down just eight weeks earlier, on June 6, 2007. Goldstein v. Pataki, 488 F. Supp. 2d 254
(E.D.N.Y. 2007).
148 See Jason G. Gottesman, Speculating as to the Plausible: PleadingPracticeAfter Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 17 WIDENER L.J. 973, 1005 (2008) (stating that Twombly is confusing the
profession because of the circuit court's disparate interpretations); see also Ettie Ward, The AfterShocks of Twombly: Will We "Notice" Pleading Changes?, 82 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 893, 904 (2008)
(noting the Court's confusing statements as to what facts must be pleaded to withstand a motion to
dismiss).
149 Edward M. Spiro, The Supreme Court's Pleading Trilogy, 238 N.Y. L.J. 23, col. 3 (2007)
(arguing that by eschewing Conley's "no set of facts" language and instead articulating Twombly's
"plausibility" language, the Court intended a more active role by lower courts in determining the
sufficiency of pleadings); see Gottesman, supra note 148, at 1004 (noting that the district courts will be
dealing with the bulk of the motions to dismiss).
150 See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1961 (2007) ("The question in this putative
class action is whether a § 1 complaint can survive a motion to dismiss ....");see also id. at 1963
("We granted certiorari to address the proper standard for pleading an antitrust conspiracy through
allegations of parallel conduct ....
").
151 See Alvarado v. KOB-TV, L.L.C., 493 F.3d 1210, 1215 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that the
plausibility standard in Twombly extends to a case involving claims for invasion of privacy and
intentional infliction of emotional distress); See also Charles B. Goodwin, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly: A
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decision hinged on an interpretation of Rule 8, rather than any specific
provision of the Sherman Act; (2) the complexity of the case is not unique
to the antitrust context; and (3) the econo-centric, pro-business tenor of the
152
holding crosses substantive boundaries.
The Twombly opinion is, at heart, a re-interpretation of Rule 8.153 The
Rule is not limited to the antitrust context, but rather governs the majority
of claims brought before the federal courts. 154 Cases governed by
provisions other than Rule 8 are the exception, not the norm. In abrogating
Conley, the Court rejected what was regarded by most as the authoritative
interpretation of Rule 8.155 When the Court held that plausibility was
required of a pleading under Rule 8 in Twombly, it arguably changed the
standard of pleading for all cases governed by that rule, inside or outside of
the antitrust context. 156
The complex circumstances of the case also point to an expansive
application of the Twombly standard.157 Antitrust cases, especially class
actions, are typically very complex. Given the intricate interplay between
the law and facts, there is often a very "fine line" between what is legal and

New Definition of Notice Pleading for Federal Courts, 79 OKLA. B. J. 519 (2008), available at
http://www.okbar.org/obj/articles8/030808goodwin.htm (stating that the Supreme Court's analysis in
Twombly was based solely on an interpretation of Rule 8(a)(2) thus applying to all pleadings governed
by that rule).
152 See Goodwin, supra note 151 (noting that federal and civil courts have applied the Twombly
plausibility standard across the broad spectrum of civil claims); see also Saritha Komatireddy Tice,
Recent Developments: A "Plausible" Explanation of Pleading Standards: Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007), 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 827, 830-831 (2008) (noting that the
effects of Twombly extend far beyond the field of antitrust).
153 Audio Recording: Richard Nagareda's comments on Supreme Court ruling in Bell Atlantic v.
2007) (audio available at http://law.vanderbilt.edu/article-search/articleTwombly (May 23,
=
detail/index.aspx?nid l 15).
154 See Komatireddy Tice, supra note 152, at 831 (stating that lower courts have cited Twombly in
an array of litigation contexts ranging from breach of contract to race discrimination to Title VII
retaliatory discharge); see also Goodwin, supra note 151 (stating that the suggestion that Twombley
only applies to antitrust cases has found little support amongst the federal and circuit courts that have
considered it).
155 See Goldstein v. Pataki, 488 F. Supp. 2d 254, 289 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) ("[T]he plausibility
standard announced in Twombly was intended to apply beyond antitrust-conspiracy cases. Were this not
so, then Twombly would not have addressed Conley v. Gibson, formerly the leading case regarding
motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim, in the manner in which it did."); see also Dodson article,
supra note 21, at 138 (noting that the best reading of Twombly is that the new standard is absolute and
that mere notice pleading is dead for all cases and all causes of action).
156 See Nagareda, supra note 153 (noting that Twombly will affect the entire modem system of
civil litigation); see also Dodson article, supra note 21, at 138 (explaining that several courts have
already interpreted the plausibility standard beyond cases involving antitrust industries).
157 See Nagareda, supra note 153 (explaining the rationales for an expansion of the Twombly
standard). See generally Michael R. Baye & Joshua D Wright, Is Antitrust Too Complicated for
Generalist Judges? The Impact of Economic Complexity & Judicial Training on Appeals I (Sept. 4,
2008) (unpublished comment, available at http://www.law.ucla.edu/docs/l1256492008bayewrightO090408_ucla.pdf) (pointing out that "Antitrust analysis is becoming increasingly complicated").
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what is illegal.158 Since there is such a fine line, antitrust cases often last
for a long period of time and the litigation process can be quite costly.
Settlements in these cases are prevalent, as the costs (in time and money) of
discovery and further litigation often coax a defendant otherwise desiring
to vigorously deny the allegations against it into a disposition by
agreement.1 59 Typically, an antitrust defendant holds much of the
information pertinent to the plaintiffs claims. Such a defendant is often a
large corporation or entity, for which complying with discovery requests
could be costly and difficult due to the sheer volume of information and
records that must be sorted through and examined. 60
Looking at these aspects of antitrust litigation, there are certainly several
substantive areas of the law that "bear more than a passing resemblance" to
Twombly.161 Securities litigation, mass torts, and employment
discrimination suits are three areas that present themselves as most
analogous to antitrust litigation.162 However, the standard will likely be
applied in a myriad of other contexts that share at least some of the
characteristics of Twombly. In addition to employment discrimination,
courts have already applied the new plausibility formulation in a trademark
case governed by the Lanham Act163 and a claim brought under § 1983
alleging violation of the plaintiffs First Amendment right to free exercise
of religion.164 The court in Goldstein v. Pataki specifically noted that the
158 See Nagareda, supra note 153 (discussing what is illegal under federal antitrust laws); see also
Baye & Wright, supra note 157, at I (noting that "fifty years ago, antitrust laws consisted primarily of
per se rules and bright line prohibitions").
159 See Christine C. Wilson & Adam J. Coates, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly: Court Should Reverse in
Antitrust Class Action, LEGAL BACKGROUNDER, Nov. 17, 2006, at 1, available at
http://www.wlf.org/upload/lll706LBwilson.pdf (arguing that plaintiffs often employ abusive
discovery practices to "hijack federal courts" in seeking "in terrorem settlements"); see also
Easterbrook, supra note 4, at 638-39 ("Judges can do little about impositional discovery when parties
control the legal claims to be presented and conduct the discovery themselves.").
160 See Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1967 (2007) (discussing the many "reams and
gigabytes" of information that discovery in the case would involve); see Dodson article,supra note 21,
at 138-39 (commenting on the "information asymmetry" faced by plaintiffs in cases where the
defendant possesses all or most of the relevant information).
161 Nagareda, supranote 153.
162 See Nagareda, supra note 153. The Blue Chip Stamps Court's discussion of the "potential for
possible abuse of the liberal discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure" in securities
cases, and resulting concern with in terrorem settlements due to the costs of litigation was written in the
same tenor of Twombly. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 741 (1975). Just as the
potential for discovery abuse "is a social cost rather than a benefit" in securities cases, so too is it in
antitrust cases. Id.
163 15 U.S.C.S § 1125 (2008) ("[A]ny word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination
thereof [which] ... is likely to cause confusion ... as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or
her goods .... "); see Collins v. Marva Collins Preparatory Sch., No. 1:05cv614, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 49410, at *22 (S.D. Ohio July 9, 2007) (stating that the "plaintiffs correctly assert[ed] that the
Lanham Act does offer protection to nonregistered marks").
164 See Watts v. Florida Int'l Univ., 495 F.3d 1289, 1295 (11 th Cir. 2007) (touching on the issue of

ST JOHN'SJOURNAL OFLEGAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 24:1

"practical concerns" in avoiding discovery were applicable outside of the
165
antitrust context in applying Twombly to an eminent domain case.
The Twombly Court also had business interests in mind when it
formulated its new pleading standard. At oral argument, several justices
66
were concerned with the effect of notice pleading on large corporations. 1
Justice Breyer even voiced a concern that an overly liberal standard would
cause a "major restructuring of the economy."1 6 7 Even Justice Stevens, in
his dissent, recognized the thrust of the decision, deriding the holding as
"armchair economics" 16 8 and foreseeing that the new rule would therefore
"invite lawyers' debates over economic theory to conclusively resolve"
claims. 169
As commentators have noted, Twombly is just one in a series of probusiness decisions. 170 In the 2006 term alone, the Court handed down
decisions in line with the position taken by the United States Chamber of
Commerce in thirteen of the sixteen cases in which the Chamber filed
amicus briefs on the merits. 17 1 Under Chief Justice Roberts, the Court has
the court's role in determining a particular belief in a religion or the plausibility of a religious claim).
165 Goldstein v. Pataki, 488 F. Supp. 2d 254, 290 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (noting that Twombly relied on
concerns "such as deterring the filing of frivolous cases and avoiding discovery in such cases" in
dismissing the complaint).
166 See Bell AtI. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1989 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating
that "[t]he transparent policy concern that drives the decision is the interest in protecting antitrust
defendants--who in this case are some of the wealthiest corporations in our economy--from the burdens
of pretrial discovery"); see also Harrow, supra note 103 ("Justice Scalia made clear that he would err
on the side of dismissing suits, believing that the time and expense of discovery will lead to meritless
suits brought to force defendants to settle.").
167 See Harrow, supra note 103. ("[lI]t seems that Breyer is implying that concentrated industries
could not continue to function if constantly sued for antitrust violations for mere parallel conduct, even
if those claims do not later survive summary judgment.").
168 Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1983 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
169 Id. at 1988.
170 See Chames & Hefferan, supra note 16, at 10 col. I (describing several recent decisions which
have had beneficial for the business community); see also Richard J. Lazarus, Advocacy Matters Before
and Within the Supreme Court: Transforming the Court by Transforming the Bar, 96 GEO. L.J. 1487,
1555 (2008) (noting that several periodicals that have described the Roberts court as being "probusiness").
171 Chames & Hefferan, supra note 16, at 10 col. I (citing examples of pro-business decisions
made by the Roberts Court); see Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965 (stating that a complaint must contain
"enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest that an agreement was made"). See generally Tellabs
Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499 (2007) (holding that for an inference of scienter to
be drawn from a complaint in a securities fraud case it must be more than merely "reasonable" or
"plausible"); Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2707 (2007)
(overruling the per se rule against resale price maintenance and holding that "vertical price restraints are
to be judged by the rule of reason"); Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v. Billing, 127 S. Ct. 2383
(2007) (ruling that federal securities law implicitly precluded the application of antitrust law to certain
behavior by securities underwriting firms); Phillip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057 (2007)
(forbidding states from employing punitive damages on a defendant for injuries to those not involved in
the litigation); KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007) (finding that the test for
determining the obviousness under § 103 of the Patent Act should be flexible so as to ensure that
innovation was not stifled).
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turned "significantly to the right," thus "tend[ing] to favor businesses over
employees and consumers." 172 One high court litigation expert, Mary Levy
even stated, "I don't think there was a significant business case that was
lost this term."1 73 Thus, the result in Twombly must be understood in this
pro-business context as just one of several decisions meant to bolster the
economic competitiveness of businesses.174 The Court has added a heavy
weight to the scales in the classic battle between the need for fairness and
due process with the need for judicial economy. Twombly, along with the
other pro-business decisions, has made the economic effects of a court's
ruling a very important factor to be weighed in the decision-making process
both inside and outside of the antitrust context.
However, the effect of Twombly will not be universal, even assuming
that Twombly is applicable outside of the antitrust context. In "simpler"
cases, the Twombly standard has far less applicability. As another recent
decision, Erickson v. Pardus,175 indicates, the Supreme Court seems not to
have intended for its newly formulated standard to bring about a complete
revolution in pleading practices.' 7 6 Instead, it appears that the Court has
provided trial courts with a tool to be used selectively, as needed under
certain circumstances.
The facts of Erickson are quite simple. Erickson, a Colorado State
inmate, brought a § 1983 claim and asserted violations of his Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights against cruel and unusual punishment.177 In
his complaint, he "alleged that a liver condition resulting from hepatitis C
required a treatment program that [prison] officials had commenced but
172 Erwin Chemerinsky, Turning Sharply to the Right, 10 GREEN BAG 2d 423, 424 (2007) (stating
that the court made a conservative move by favoring the government over individuals); see Marcia
Coyle, In the First Full Term with Alito, Court Took Marked Conservative Turn, 29 NAT'L L.J. 49, at I
col. 1 (2007) (concluding that the Court's attention to business cases is "in keeping with what the
business community hoped for when Roberts became chief justice" (quoting Mark Levy, of counsel to
the Washington office of the firm of Kilpatrick Stockton)).
173 Coyle, supra note 172, at 1 col. I (quoting Mark Levy, of counsel to the Washington office of
the firm of Kilpatrick Stockton).
174 The Twombly Court received a multitude of amicus curiae briefs from business interests
supporting the defendant ILECs. See Brief of Mastercard Int'l Inc. & Visa U.S.A. Inc. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioners, Bell At1. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007) (No. 05-1126); Brief of the
American Petroleum Institute as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Bell Aft. Corp. v. Twombly,
127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007) (No. 05-1126). Also, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a brief and was
heard at oral argument in support of the corporate defendants. See Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007) (No. 05-1126);
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 92, at 17-28.
175 127 S. Ct. 2197 (2007) (per curiam).
176 See Dodson article,supranote 21, at 139 ("Still others have suggested that Erickson v. Pardus
. . . mitigates [Twombly's] significance."); see also Posting of Amy Howe to SCOTUSbIog,
http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/archieves/2007/06/more-on__yesterd-l.html (June 5, 2007,
17:10 EST) (discussing Erickson).
177 Erickson, 127 S. Ct. at 2197.
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then wrongfully terminated, with life-threatening consequences."1 78 His
complaint was dismissed by the district court for failing to allege that the
defendants' actions had caused "substantial harm" to the petitioner.179 The
Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal, finding that the Erickson had made
only "'conclusory allegations to the effect that he has suffered a cognizable
independent harm as a result of his removal from the [hepatitis C]
treatment program."1 80
The Supreme Court, in a per curiam decisionl8' released just two weeks
after Twombly was handed down,182 reversed the Tenth Circuit's judgment
to find that "[t]he case cannot... be dismissed on the ground that
petitioner's allegations of harm were too conclusory to put these matters in
issue."18 3 The Court noted that Rule 8(a)(2) requires only that a complaint
"give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds
upon which it rests."' 184 While the Court cited Twombly in support of this
proposition,185 it made no mention of the plausibility requirement at any
point in Erickson. In fact, the Court specifically avoided examining that
complaint's plausibility, noting that "[i]t may in the final analysis be shown
that the District Court was correct to grant respondents' motion to dismiss
[, but] [t]hat is not the issue here." 186 The opinion even went so far as to
deride the Tenth Circuit's "departure from the liberal pleading standards set
forth by Rule 8(a)(2),"1 8 7 the nature of which the Court had sharply
criticized in Twombly. The Court found that Erickson had satisfied Rule
8(a)(2) by the following three allegations alone: (1) that "medication was
withheld 'shortly after' petitioner had commenced a treatment program that
would take one year"; (2) that Erickson was "'still in need of treatment'
178 Id. at 2197-98. The Court also noted that "[i]n his complaint petitioner alleged Dr. Bloor had
'removed [him] from [his] hepatitis C treatment' ... 'thus endangering [his] life,' ... [and that] he was
suffering from 'continued damage to [his] liver' as a result of the nontreatment." Id. at 2199.
179 Seeld. at2199.
180 Id. (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 198 F. App'x 694, 698 (10th Cir. 2006)).
181 Justice Scalia would have denied the petition for certiorari altogether. Id. at 2200. Justice
Thomas dissented, arguing that the Eighth Amendment relates to "only injuries relating to a criminal
sentence." Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
182 Twombly was decided on May 21, 2007. Bell Atl. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007).
Erickson was decided on June 4, 2007. Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197 (2007).
183 Erickson, 127 S. Ct. at 2200.
184 Id. (citing Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1964).
185 The Court also cited Twombly (which itself had quoted language from Conley) as authority in
stating that "Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only 'a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief" and in noting that "specific facts are not necessary."
Id.
186 Id. at 2199-200. The Court reiterated this lack of concern with the plausibility of the complaint
later when the Court commented that "[w]hether petitioner's complaint is sufficient in all respects is a
matter yet to be determined .... Id. at 2200.
187 Id. at 2200 ("This alone was enough to satisfy Rule 8(a)(2).").
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for hepatitis C; and (3) that the prison officials were refusing to provide
that treatment. 18 8
While the Court, as evidenced by its citing of Twombly in Erickson,
presumably felt that the decisions were consistent, the tension between the
holdings seems quite evident.' 8 9 The apparent implication arising from
Erickson is that, despite the problems discussed in Twombly, notice
pleading is not dead.190 The permissive tone of Erickson reaffirms the
purpose of the Federal Rules to do away with fact pleading.191 However,
this does not mean Twombly was an aberration, limited to the very narrow
context of allegations of parallel conduct in an antitrust case. As noted
above, Twombly will indeed have relatively broad applicability. Erickson
simply makes clear that the Twombly plausibility standard is unnecessary in
19 2
every case brought before a trial court.
The uncertainty caused by the tension between Twombly and Erickson
begs an obvious question: exactly under which circumstances is the new
Twombly standard to be applied? Perhaps the most notable discussion of
this issue can be found in the Second Circuit's decision in Iqbal v.
Hasty.193 Iqbal involved a claim brought by a Pakistani pretrial detainee
who alleged that various former and current government officials "took a
188 Id. Thus, the Court found that "it was error for the Court of Appeals to conclude that
[Erickson's] allegations ... were too conclusory to establish for pleading purposes that petitioner has
suffered 'a cognizable independent harm' as a result of his removal from the hepatitis C treatment
program." Id.
189 See Joseph, supra note 87, at 13col. I (explaining that Erickson appears to diminish the
extensiveness of Twombly's "change [of] the law of notice pleading"); see also Spiro, supra note 99, at
6 col. I (noting the "obvious tension" caused by the Court's "mixed signals").
190 See Matthew A. Josephson, Some Things are Better Left Said: Pleading Practice After Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 42 GA. L. REV. 867, 903-04 (2008) (asserting that Twombly's plausibility
standard will be applied outside of the antitrust context, but its application will be limited); see also
Posting of Mike O'Shea to Concurring Opinions, http://www.concurringopinions
.com/archives/2007/06/how-cautionary-l.html (June 6, 2007, 18:47 EST) (referring to Erickson as a
"Don't Get Carried Away" decision limiting the scope of Twombly, but also noting the uncertainty as to
the exact interplay between the two decisions). But see Spencer, supra note 104, at 431 (arguing that
"[n]otice pleading is dead").
191 See Josephson, supra note 190, at 903 (stating that circumstances suggest Erickson was written
to assure lower courts that the rules of pleading had not been drastically revised); see also Spiro, supra
note 99, at 6 col. 1 (commenting on the "Court's insistence that [Twombly's] plausibility standard does
not alter the traditional notice pleading requirements of Rule 8(a)(2).").
192 See Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 2200 ("Specific facts are not necessary; the statement
need only 'give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests."'
(quoting Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964 (2007)); see also Colleen McMahon, The
Law of Unintended Consequences: Shockwaves in the Lower Courts After Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 451 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 851, 859-60 (2008) (describing how the Supreme Court itself, soon
after Twombly, employed a different standard in Erickson).
193 490 F.3d 143, 157 (2d Cir. 2007) ("These conflicting signals create some uncertainty as to the
intended scope of the Court's decision. We are reluctant to assume that all of the language of Bell
Atlantic applies only to section 1 allegations based on competitors' parallel conduct or, slightly more
broadly, only to antitrust cases.").
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series of unconstitutional actions against him in connection with his
confinement under harsh conditions" in a federal detention center. 194 The
defendants, a group of various government officials, moved to dismiss the
plaintiffs claims.1 95 The district court denied the motions with a few
exceptions, finding that the complaint's allegations were largely
96
sufficient.1
On appeal by the defendants, the Second Circuit had to determine which
standard was applicable before actually examining the validity of the
complaint's allegations. In doing so, the court determined that Twombly
was applicable to the case. 197 Discussing the various conflicting signals
from Twombly as to the nature and scope of the plausibility standard,198 the
Iqbal court concluded that the standard was indeed applicable outside of
the antitrust context.199 As the court wrote:
After careful consideration of the Court's opinion [in Twombly]
194 Id. at 147. Essentially, lqbal claimed that following his arrest by Immigration and
Naturalization Service agents in November of 2001, he was classified as a high risk detainee due to his
race, religion, and national origin. Id. at 147-48. That classification, lqbal alleged, led to prolonged
mistreatment and brutal physical abuse of which high level officials, like Former Attorney General John
Ashcroft and FBI Director Robert Mueller, among others, were at least aware and may have actually
condoned. Id. at 148-49.
195 lqbal asserted 21 causes of action. See id. at 149 n.3. The defendants asserted several grounds
for dismissal, namely that "(1) [the actions were barred by the] 'special factors' [of the post-9/ 11
context]; (2) they were protected by qualified immunity; (3) the supervisory defendants were not
alleged to have sufficient personal involvement; and (4) [several of the defendants] were not subject to
personal jurisdiction in New York." Id. at 150. Rule 8(a)(2) and Twombly were implicated by the
motions to dismiss on the grounds of qualified immunity and lack of personal involvement. Id. at 153.
196 See id. at 147 (noting the named plaintiff in the district court litigation later dropped out of the
case after reaching a settlement with the United States in the form of a $300,000 payment); see also
Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, No. 04 CV 1409 (JG)(SMG), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21434, at *114
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005) (citing the district court's denial of the defendant's motions to dismiss).
197 See lqbal, 490 F.3d at 155 ("However, the Court's explanation for its holding [in Twombly]
indicated that it intended to make some alteration in the regime of pure notice pleading that had
prevailed ... ever since [Conley] was decided halfa century ago."); see also id. at 157 n.7 ("[I]t would
be cavalier to believe that the Court's rejection of the 'no set of facts' language from Conley, which has
been cited by federal courts at least 10,000 times in a wide variety of contexts (according to a Westlaw
search), applies only to section 1 antitrust claims.").
198 Id. 155-57. The factors the court cited as supporting an expansive scope to Twombly included:
(1)the Court's disavowal of Conley's "'no set of facts' language; (2) the Court's apparent indication
that more than notice of a claim was required to allege a sufficient allegation; (3) the ineffectiveness of
"'careful case management"' in weeding out implausible claims; and (4) the Court's encapsulation of
its various requirements into "what it labeled 'the plausibility standard"'. Id. at 155-56. Factors
militating in favor of a narrower scope were: (I) the Court's explicit disclaimer of a requirement of
"'heightened fact pleading of specifics'; (2) the manner by which the Court expressed its approval of
Form 9 (which the Second Circuit described as "generalized"); (3) the Court's heavy emphasis on the
heavy costs of discovery in complex cases; (4) the Court's failure to disclaim its prior statement that
summary judgment and control of discovery to weed out weak claims; and (5) the Court's permissive
tone in Erickson. Id. at 156-57.
199 See id. at 157. "We are reluctant to assume that all of the language of [Tivombly] applies only to
section 1 allegations based on competitors' parallel conduct or, slightly more broadly, only to antitrust
cases." Id.
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and the conflicting signals from it that we have identified, we
believe the Court is not requiring a universal standard of
heightened fact pleading, but is instead requiring a flexible
"plausibility standard," which obliges a pleader to amplify a
such
claim with some factual allegations in those contexts20where
0
amplification is needed to render the claim plausible.
The Court then applied its interpretation of the standard, finding that the
plaintiff had sufficiently alleged plausible claims. 20 1
Iqbal's view of the Twombly as a flexible, circumstantially dependent
standard seems to have gained relative acceptance by federal courts in
determining whether Twombly plausibility is applicable to the case at
hand. 202 However, this view is not universally shared: one district court has
found Twombly to be confined to antitrust cases, 20 3 while another is of the
view that the plausibility standard is to be applied anytime 12(b)(6)
204
motions are considered.
200 Id. at 157-58.
201 Id. at 160-78. The Second Circuit did, however, dismiss plaintiff's claimed violation of
procedural due process, not because of insufficient pleading, but rather due to the uncertainty in the
case law that precluded a finding that lqbal's right to procedural due process was clearly established.
See id. at 167. The court concluded that while the plaintiff had adequately pleaded a violation of a
procedural due process right "in this case 'officers of reasonable competence could [have] disagree[d]'
whether their conduct violated a clearly established procedural due process right." Id. (quoting Malley
v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).
202 See Collins v. Marva Collins Preparatory Sch., No. 1:05cv614, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49410,
at *9 n.l (S.D. Ohio July 9, 2007). In Collins, the court noted that, while the Sixth Circuit had not yet
applied Twombly or lqbal, eight district courts in the Sixth Circuit had adopted the Iqbal interpretation.
Id. (citing U. S. ex rel. Howard v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 499 F. Supp. 2d 972 (S.D. Ohio 2007);
Massey v. Inman, No. 2:06-CV-76, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46389 (E.D. Tenn. June 26, 2007); Ellis v.
Bradley County, No. 1:06-CV-260, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45715 (E.D. Tenn. June 22, 2007); Fisher v.
Caruso, Nos. 03-71804, 06-11110, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45366 (E.D. Mich. June 22, 2007);
McKnight v. Gates, No. 3:06-1019, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44955 (M.D. Tenn. June 20, 2007); Reid v.
Purkey, No. 2:06-CV-40, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42761 (E.D. Tenn. June 11, 2007); Agfa Photo United
States Corp. v. Parham, No. 1:06-CV-216, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40980 (E.D. Tenn. June 5, 2007)).
The Sixth Circuit, weeks later, applied Twombly in League of United Latin American Citizens v.
Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523, 527 (6th Cir. 2007), and noted its approval of lqbal in Weisbarth v. Geauga
Park District, 499 F.3d 538, 541-42 (6th Cir. 2007). See also Gaffer Ins. Co. v. Discover Reinsurance
Co., No. 3:07-CV-00580, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75259, at *9 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 10, 2007). The court held
it "will follow the guidance of the Second and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeals, and apply a flexible
'plausibility' standard, on a case-by-case basis, in those contexts in which it is deemed appropriate that
the pleader be obliged to amplify a claim with sufficient factual allegations." Id. at *9.
203 See United States v. Harchar, No. 1:06-cv-2927, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47028, at *4 (N.D.
Ohio June 28, 2007) (finding that "Twombly merely held that a complaint that alleged only parallel
conduct did not state a claim for an antitrust conspiracy" and that "[t]he Supreme Court did not purport
to change the applicable 12(b)(6) standards").
204 See Aktieselskabet AF 21. Nov. 2001 v. Fame Jeans, Inc., 511 F. Supp. 2d. 1, 16 (D.D.C. 2007)
(noting that "other district courts have not sought to confine Twombly's teachings to their original
context" and applying the plausibility standard to a complaint alleging trademark infringement); see
also Farmland Indus., Inc. v. Rinaldi, 376 B.R. 718, 722 n.6 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. July 17, 2007)
(discussing that Fame Jeans, Inc. "suggest[ed] that Twombly created an across-the-board heightened
pleading standard").
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Even if all courts were in accord with the Iqbal approach, confusion
would remain regarding the scope of Twombly's applicability. Exactly
what are "those contexts" in which amplification is needed? Since the
Iqbal court envisioned a flexible approach, it is not surprising that the
decision did not give a precise definition. Nonetheless, the fact remains
that practitioners and trial judges alike are in large part forced to guess at
when the Twombly plausibility standard is to be applied.
First, "those contexts" may refer to cases in which the cause of action is
"disfavored" by the courts. Such a reading would view the Supreme Court
as having imposed a more rigorous standard on the plaintiffs in Twombly
not because of any specific factors in the case itself, but rather (at least
primarily) because the Court felt that the cause of action asserted, a
violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act, was particularly undesirable and
should be limited in applicability. Thus, the plausibility standard would
serve as a roadblock discouraging plaintiffs from filing certain causes of
action that were found to be "disfavored." Whether this is the correct
interpretation or not, the Twombly decision's vagueness lends itself to the
possibility that a trial judge might employ Twombly as a pretext to
scrutinize certain disfavored claims more rigorously. 205
"Those contexts" may also refer to the relative ease of inferences
required of a trial court in analyzing a complaint. Under this interpretation,
Twombly requires a judge to look objectively at the asserted injury and
determine whether it is plausible that the alleged defendant caused that
harm before he or she even reads the supporting factual allegations. 206 If
the judge finds it implausible that the defendant caused the asserted injury,
the factual basis for the claim should then be rigorously examined. If the
asserted injury is objectively plausible, then only a cursory reading is
necessary, which only requires that the complaint give some basic notice of
the claim. 207
"Those contexts" may also concern the complexity of the case, referring
205 For example, a judge supporting massive tort reform might find that "those contexts" include
all personal injury claims, while another judge in favor of expanded consumers' rights might determine
that a more rigorous standard is warranted in breach of contract claims brought by corporations against
consumers.
206 According to such a reading, the trial court should have first determined, without examining the
allegations of the complaint, if it was plausible that the four telecommunications companies in Twombly
conspired.
207 Thus, a complaint alleging that the defendant negligently drove into the plaintiff and injured
him would be considered plausible (objectively, car accidents happen all the time and it is likely that
one of the drivers was negligent). On the other hand, a complaint alleging an agreement by four massive
corporations not to compete would be objectively implausible and a trial judge would require that
complaint to lay out in detail the underlying basis for the allegations.
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to the cost in time and money that discovery is likely to require. Thus,
Twombly could be read to require a trial court to make an initial
determination of the claims before it, and to decide whether they are
complex and thus warranting increased scrutiny for their plausibility, or
simple and not meriting such a strictly discerning eye. 20 8 Under this
interpretation, practitioners should envision a "complexity spectrum" to be
in effect, and should attempt to present to a trial judge a picture of the case
at hand that places it on whichever end of the spectrum (complex or
simple) that will result in the level of scrutiny (heavy or light) most
beneficial to their client's interests. The more arduous and time-consuming
discovery is likely to be, the more likely it is that Twombly will be
applicable.
The issue of which of these interpretations is correct is not a question
this paper will attempt to answer. After all, the "proper" interpretation will
be the one that is most often adopted by the various courts - only time will
reveal the prevailing view. The very fact that (at least) three widely
divergent meanings of "those contexts" can be inferred from the Twombly
decision demonstrates the extremely subjective nature of the scope of
Twombly. 209 Therefore, it appears the problem of when plausibility analysis
will be undertaken by a trial court has its solution rooted not in any
objective guideposts, but rather in the subjective interpretations of trial
judges.
Any time a rule or standard is to be applied in a case-by-case manner, as
Iqbal suggests Twombly is to be considered, substantial uncertainty will
exist as to the effect of that rule. 2 10 The subjective worldviews of judges
are called upon to play an important role in determining which cases are
dismissed and those that are allowed to proceed to the discovery stage.
Indeed, the lock holding closed the proverbial "gate" to discovery will have
208 See Josephson, supra note 190, at 897 (commenting on the potential for increased emphasis on
the relationship between complexity of the case and greater details in pleadings required by courts after
Twombly); see also Patrick A. Jackson & John J. McLaughlin, Jr., Supreme Court Announces New
"Plausibility"Standardfor Rule 12(b)(6) Dismissal:Not Just Any "Conceivable" Set of Facts Will Do,
26-6 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 34, 61 (2007) (positing that Twombly could possibly have an affect on
complex bankruptcy court proceedings).
209 See Josephson, supra note 190, at 871 (noting the district courts and federal circuit courts have
taken divergent views when applying Twombly); see also Ward, supra note 148, at 910-18 (2008)
(considering the many possible ways in which Twombly could be applied by courts in the future).
210 Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 155 ("Considerable uncertainty concerning the standard for
assessing the adequacy of pleadings has recently been created by the Supreme Court's decision in
[Twombly]."); see Accenture Global Servs. GMBH v. Guidewire Software Inc., No. 07-826-SLR, 2008
U.s. Dist. LEXIS 79958, at * 14 (D. Del. Oct. 8, 2008) (noting "the apparent conflict between
Twombly's emphasis on 'plausibility' and the Court's statements that it was not adopting or applying a
'heightened pleading standard').
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a different combination for every judge. Thus, as in any other context
where no bright-line rule has been promulgated, inconsistent jurisprudence
seems to be inevitable.2 11
III. THIS DUAL CONFUSION WILL TEMPER THE GOALS OF THE
TWOMBL Y COURT
The combination of the vague definition of a plausible claim and the
complex-simple distinction points courts and practitioners down an
uncharted path. The Seventh Circuit has observed that, "[t]aking Erickson
and Twombly together, we understand the Court to be saying only that at
some point the factual detail in a complaint may be so sketchy that the
complaint does not provide the type of notice of the claim to which the
defendant is entitled under Rule 8."212 However, as recent attempts by
courts and commentators alike have shown, where that "point" lies is far
from established. The net result of this uncertainty has been and will
continue to be a lack of uniformity within the federal judiciary.2 13 Indeed,
the Court's attempt to lessen the burden of "'sprawling, costly, and hugely
time-consuming"' litigation on civil defendants is so poorly adapted to the
accomplishment of its goals that the process of finding the meaning of the
new standard will be "'sprawling, costly, and hugely time-consuming."' 2 14
As noted above, the Supreme Court's fundamental concern in Twombly
was its perception of the costly and time-consuming burden extensive
discovery places upon modem complex litigation. The goal of Twombly, it
seems, is to diminish the effects of this burden on defendants by making it
more difficult for plaintiffs to get their claims to the discovery stage. In
doing so, the potential for the abusive use of discovery, first addressed by
211 The likelihood of dissonance within courts in their application of the plausibility standard is
undoubtedly heightened by the highly political nature of Twombly's key factor: the high cost of
discovery on defendants. It takes no stretch of the imagination to see how so-called conservative judges
might over-utilize Twombly to protect corporate interests, while so-called liberal judges might
concurrently apply the standard in such a way as to prevent damage to the due process rights of
(comparatively) economically disadvantaged litigants in their fight against wealthy corporate
defendants. See supra notes 151-58 and accompanying text.
212 Airborne Beepers & Video, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 499 F.3d 663, 667 (7th Cir. 2007).
213 Even within the antitrust context, application of Twombly has not been uniform. For instance, in
In re Elevator Litigation, 502 F.3d 47 (2d Cir. 2007), the Second Circuit implied that Twombly raised
the pleading standard to require plausibility rather than mere statements consistent with illegal conduct.
However, in Hyland v. Homeservices of America, No. 3:05-CV0612-R, 2007 WL 2407233 (W.D. Ky.
Aug. 17, 2007), the court did not stress that Twombly required a more stringent pleading standard.
214 Dodson article, supra note 21, at 142 (indicating that because the meaning of Twombly is
difficult to understand it will result in expensive and time-consuming litigation); see Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1988 n.13 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that there is "[t]he
potential for 'sprawling, costly, and hugely time-consuming' discovery").
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the Court in Blue Chip Stamps, 2 15 would be limited. While the ruling,
especially in light of the Iqbal "flexibility" interpretation, is certainly a
large step in pursuit of this cost-limiting goal, the ambiguity surrounding
the application of the standard will severely temper Twombly's
effectiveness in achieving it.216 Because the reinterpretation of the meaning
of Rule 8 involves such a high degree of uncertainty, the Court's decision
to use reinterpretation instead of the process of amending the text of the
Rule itself will hamper the ruling's effectiveness in preventing discovery
abuse.
First, fewer claims will be filed by plaintiffs. This "chilling" effect that
Twombly will have on individuals with tenuous claims is perhaps the most
significant of any change resulting from the institution of the plausibility
standard. 2 17 Potential plaintiffs will be deterred from filing complaints due
to the increased likelihood that the complaint will be dismissed. Moreover,
the requirement that allegations be "amplified" in certain contexts will
force plaintiffs to spend increased resources early in the litigation process,
the prospect of which will cause cash-strapped individuals to refrain from
filing their claims, even when their chance of success is reasonably
"plausible." 2 18 Whether one agrees or disagrees with the wisdom of such a
policy, the ability of Twombly to prevent complaints from being filed by
plaintiffs will be the most successful means by which discovery
215 See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 741 (1975) ("[T]o the extent that
[the discovery process] ... permits a plaintiff with a largely groundless claim to simply take up the time
of a number of other people, with the right to do so representing an in terrorem increment of the
settlement value, rather than a reasonably founded hope that the process will reveal relevant evidence, it
is a social cost rather than a benefit.").
216 In re Elevator, 502 F.3d at 50 (mentioning that "'[c]onsiderable uncertainty' surrounds the
Supreme Court's decision in Twombly); Ollie v. Piano Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 4:06-cv-069, 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 22077, at *6 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 20, 2008) ("[Twombly] has generated an ample amount of
discussion, it is not clear how far, if much at all, it departs from the previously accepted pleading
standard.").
217 Bell Atl. Corp. v.Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1967 (2007), ("[T]he threat of discovery expense
will push cost-conscious defendants to settle even anemic cases before reaching those proceedings.
Probably, then, it is only by taking care to require allegations that reach the level suggesting conspiracy
that we can hope to avoid the potentially enormous expense of discovery in cases with no 'reasonably
founded hope that the [discovery] process will reveal relevant evidence ....');
see lqbal v. Hasty, 490
F.3d 143, 156-157 (2007) (mentioning the effects the holding set forth in Twombly may have on future
litigation of "anemic" cases).
218 Civil Plaintiffs, often financially overmatched by civil defendants, will be deterred from filing
suit because of the likely increase to their expenses resulting from Twombly. See Mark Samson,
Arizona Should Avoid Twombly's Pernicious Effects, ARIZ. ATT'Y, Sept. 2007, at 27-28. This, of
course, has the probability of discouraging truly meritorious claims and even those upon which the
potential plaintiff could very well have prevailed after discovery and trial, as the "Court's standard is
likely to bar many ... cases ...with merit." See Dodson article,supranote 21, at 124-25. Such a result
is particularly likely in the antitrust context where the defendant holds all the evidence (e-mails,
memoranda, etc.) that would establish the existence of illegal conduct. Id. Some of the harshest
criticism of Tvombly has been along these lines. Id.
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expenditures will be limited. 2 19 However, its effectiveness in "chilling"
plaintiffs will be hampered significantly by the inconsistent results arising
from the ruling's application. Given the substantial uncertainty in whether
and how Twombly will be applied, the deterrent effect on plaintiffs will
likely be diminished. 220 With a clearer standard, even fewer complaints
would be filed.
Where the plaintiff is not deterred from filing a complaint, it is clear that
Twombly will lead to a rise in the filing of 12(b)(6) motions, given the more
rigorous challenge complaints will face under the plausibility regime. 22 1 In
cases where the motion is denied and discovery takes place, all Twombly
will have done is add an extra layer of motion practice to the litigation,
adding to the time, money, and resources spent by the parties to achieve
exactly the same result to which the old Conley formulation would have
led. To the extent that this outcome results, Twombly has actually served to
increase costs, which is contrary to the policy concerns of the Court.
However, given the more stringent standard of plausibility, it is likely
that the number of dismissals will also increase. 222 Where dismissals are
granted without prejudice, plaintiffs will be forced to investigate the
circumstances of their claims further in order to file an amended complaint
that rises to the requisite level of plausibility. To the extent that this shifts
some of the costs of discovery away from defendants, this result is
consistent with the spirit of Twombly. However, if the initial complaint was
missing only a few facts that are easily discoverable, the court's dismissal
without prejudice will have accomplished very little, forcing the plaintiff to
run one simple errand before getting to discovery. The defendant may even
have a net increase in costs from the process. 223 Twombly's inconsistency,
219 See Samson, supra note 218, at 28 (arguing that "[t]he ability to increase plaintiffs' expenses in
all cases, good or bad, and the resulting 'chilling' of plaintiffs is the most pernicious effect of
Twombly"); see also Josephson, supra note 190, at 900 (finding that the volume of litigation going to
discovery may decrease under Twombly's standards).
220 After all, the effect of any discouragement to a potential plaintiff from a rigorous plausibility
challenge is diminished to the extent that the likelihood of such a challenge will not be conducted at all.
221 See Samson, supra note 218, at 28 (commenting that Twombly "mak[es] motions to dismiss
more viable."); see also Josephson, supra note 190, at 903 (showing that motions to dismiss are more
feasible because "a judge must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint").
222 See Tice, surpa note 9, at 830 (noting that "[t]he Court's decision in Twombly ... reflects a
significant move away from the litigation-promoting mindset embodied in Conley and instead solidifies
what has been a growing hostility toward litigation."); see also Suja A. Thomas, Why the Motion to
Dismiss Is Now Unconstitutional, 92 MINN. L. REv. 1851, 1856 (2008) (stating that courts have
"exponentially increased" its use of motions to dismiss).
223 Even though the defendant would presumably save resources as a result of not having to
provide the plaintiff with t information that the pre-amended complaint investigation garnered, the
combined cost of the motion to dismiss the initial complaint and the inevitable motion to dismiss the
amended complaint may exceed the savings.
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insofar that a plaintiff is uncertain as to where exactly the threshold of
plausibility lies, may very likely lead to repetitive motion practice where a
judge willing to give plaintiffs the opportunity to replead several times.
Where dismissals are granted with prejudice, the appeals process will
sometimes interfere with the pursuit of limiting costs. 224 Where dismissals
are successfully appealed, the parties are sent back to the district court, the
same place they would have been had the trial court denied the motion to
dismiss, only having spent X more months and Y more dollars to reach the
same result. The trial judge's application of the plausibility standard,
therefore, would again have resulted in nothing but an extra layer of
litigation and increased costs. The likelihood of this result is significantly
enhanced by Twombly's inconsistency, especially given the acceptance of
Iqbal's flexible, case-by-case approach. 225 The probability that the
interpretation of the circuit court will differ from that of the district court is
substantial.
The result is best for a defendant, of course, when the circuit court
affirms the trial court's dismissal of the complaint. This is because the
defendant has entirely avoided the costs of discovery, having to spend only
a comparatively small amount of time and resources in filing a motion to
dismiss and defending the grant of that motion on appeal. 226 The outcome
in such circumstances is most in line with the goals of Twombly, especially
when the "trickle-down chilling" effect on the particular class of claims is
considered. 227 However, it must be remembered that the extent of this
''success" in other cases will be limited by inconsistent results within the
same context.
As many critics of Twombly have noted, much of the inconsistency
arising from the decision results from the method the Court has chosen to
224 The court granted defendant's motion to dismiss with prejudice, which if appealed, would
result in extra costs. Saunders v. Port Auth. of N.Y., No. 02 Civ. 9768 (RLC), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
8482, at *15 (S.D.N.Y May 10, 2004). The district court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss,
which would raise expenses in an appeal. Norley v. HSBC Bank USA, No. 03 Civ. 2318 (DLC), 2003
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21976, at *24 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2003).
225 See supra note 202 and accompanying text (discussing the Iqbal decision's "relative
acceptance").
226 Ward, supra note 148, at 916 (2008) (noting that post-Twombly defendants are likely to predict
an increased rate of success on a 12(b)(6) motion); see Max Huffman, The Necessity of Pleading
Elements in Private Antitrust Conspiracy Claims, 10 U. PA. J. BUS. & EMP. L. 627, 642-43 (2008)
(alleging that an antitrust plaintiff's lack of access to information necessary to draft a sufficient
complaint will benefit a defendant, as the court will be more likely to affirm his motion to dismiss). But
see McMahon, supra note 192, at 870 (commenting that the lack of predictability regarding how a court
will interpret Twombly may actually prejudice the "cost-conscious" defendant).
227 Just as the Supreme Court's decision in Twombly will discourage other individuals from filing
their own antitrust claims where the circumstances are similar, so too will an appeals court's decision to
affirm the dismissal of a particular claim deter similar claims in the legal context at issue.
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effect change. 22 8 The Court did not employ the usual process of amending
the federal rules to change the pleading standard, which Congress instituted
to encourage "informed deliberation" when changes in the rules of
procedure in federal courts are considered.2 29 Instead, the Court left the text
of Rule 8(a)(2) alone but acted to change the meaning of that text with
"judicial overlay." 230 Rather than having Committee Notes to examine in
order to understand the meaning of the new standard and the extent of its
applicability, lower courts and practitioners have only the Twombly opinion
itself to guide their analysis.2 31 Thus, it is left for courts and attorneys to
discern the contours of the plausibility standard through an adversarial
process, to which the interested parties approach with the narrow focus of
deciding the case's discrete issue at hand, largely blind to the broader
implications that a particular result may have. 232 The end result of the
Court's adoption of a new standard by interpretation of Rule 8(a)(2) rather
than amendment of the rule is can only be inconsistency, with consensus
being attained only after a "sprawling, costly, and hugely time-consuming"
process.

233

228 Philips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d. 224, 230 (3d. Cir. 2007) (noting that Twombly's
impact on Rule 12(b)(6) is confusing because even though the Court rejects the "no set of facts"
language, it does not attempt to change the Rules' framework); see McMahon, supra note 192, at 867
(claiming that it is constitutionally questionable for the Court to impose a "factfinding-like exercise[ ] at
the pleading stage" if Congress has not amended Rule 8).
229 See Bell AtI. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1979 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing
28 U.S.C. §§ 2072-2074 (2000 & Supp. IV)) (commenting that Congress, through the Rules Enabling
Act, has established a process for revising the Federal Rules); see also McMahon, supra note 192 at
868-69 (suggesting that the Judicial Conference did not amend the rule because the process would be a
time-consuming burden and ultimately within Congress's power).
230 Posting of Ted Frank, supra note 84 (noting that 28 U.S.C. § 2072 gives the Court the authority
to amend the rules).
231 The fact that current members of the Court have very little experience in litigation, with none
having spent significant time as a trial court judge, only serves to highlight the problematic method
employed by the Court. See Chemerinsky, supra note 172, at 437-38. Rather than being the result of the
"informed deliberation" of the members of the Judicial Conference, the new plausibility standard is an
expression of the best judgment of seven individuals relatively unfamiliar with the daily process of
litigation at the trial level. See id. Even though most of the Justices have no experience as trial lawyers,
most of their decisions involve judgments about how trials can be run more effectively. See Michael
Dorf, The Supreme Court Wreaks Havoc in the Lower Federal Courts--Again (Aug. 13, 2007),
http://writ.news.findlaw.comldorf/
20070813.html.
232 See Posting of Ted Frank, supra note 84 ("This is not a place for the Supreme Court to
intervene as judges-but the Supreme Court can fix the problem with the rules under their authority
granted to it by Congress under 28 U.S.C. §2072, and Congress can also step in."); see also Kendall W.
Hannon, Much Ado About Twombly?, A Study on the Impact of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly on
12(b)(6) Motions. 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1811, 1839 (2008) (noting that attorneys are in the habit of
pleading well beyond the requirements of Rule 8).
233 Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1967 n.6.
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CONCLUSION
Bell Atlantic v. Twombly has brought about a momentous change to an
issue that most believed was settled fifty years ago. Concerned with the
burdensome nature of modem litigation, the Court "retired" the wellknown "no set of facts" language of Conley v. Gibson in favor of a standard
requiring a factual basis rendering a claim "plausible on its face."
However, in defining the new standard in such vague terms, the Court has
injected a significant amount of inconsistency into pleadings jurisprudence.
Both the meaning and the scope of applicability of Twombly leave much to
be decided by judicial interpretation at the district and circuit court levels.
The effect of the Twombly, while far from insignificant, will be
considerably restricted because of the inconsistency of the new standard.
Whether one agrees or disagrees with the wisdom of instituting a more
rigorous standard for a plaintiff to get his claim to the discovery stage, it is
clear that the Court's method of doing so will bring about a significant
level of consternation among judges, practitioners, and law students for the
foreseeable future. It may be only after the Court revisits its decision to
clarify the contours of the standard that we will learn what is truly required
to defeat a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.

